As global attention turns to the highly anticipated Trump-Xi summit, questions about the future of U.S.-China relations, economic competition, and geopolitical stability loom large. Against a backdrop of rising tensions and deep interdependence, experts from across the University of Pennsylvania and the Perry World House network share their perspectives on what is at stake, what outcomes to watch for, and how this meeting could shape the next phase of global politics.
Julio S. Amador III is a Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow and Executive Director of the Philippine-American Educational Foundation (Fulbright Commission in the Philippines.)
The Trump-Xi Summit: A View from Manila
The Philippines recently concluded the 48th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit and a stand-alone Leaders’ statement on the response to the Middle East crisis was issued. Against this backdrop, the upcoming Trump-Xi summit is a matter of concern for Southeast Asia not only because of the current crisis, but also in anticipation of what can come next.
- Given President Trump’s propensity for deal-making, the question in mind is what kind of deals will be made? Would the summit be a revival of the idea of a G2? Will the South China Sea be discussed? What about the status of Taiwan? I expect that the two powers will prioritize strategic stability as a shared goal, regardless.
- The upcoming summit exposes the Philippines’ unique position. In an era of intensifying great power competition, its geography places it along the fault lines of the Indo-Pacific—at the intersection of the South China Sea, the First Island Chain, and the Taiwan Strait. Its alliance commitments tie it closely to the United States, while its economic realities bind it to China. The Philippines will examine the summit from these perspectives and will seek to avert any circumstance that weakens the alliance.
- Across multiple surveys, Filipinos consistently register deeply negative perceptions of China and strong support for defending Philippine rights in the West Philippine Sea. For instance: Around 68 percent of Filipinos support continued public disclosure of China’s actions in Philippine waters. Approximately 73 percent support asserting maritime rights based on international law. This is not a marginal phenomenon—it is a structural constraint. Public opinion now narrows the policy space available to decision-makers. Any approach by the United States perceived as conciliatory toward China risks domestic political backlash in Manila.
- In the wider Southeast Asian region, half of the members of ASEAN already favor China over the United States; the perception regarding this visit, will affirm those whose views are more favorable to China, in that even the United States is seeking a deal with the regional great power. The United States should assuage any concerns that the upcoming summit will be at the expense of Southeast Asia.
Jacques deLisle is the Stephen A. Cozen Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China.
“Small Ball” Summitry: What We Should Expect to See on the Agenda in Beijing
The meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping is likely to be an exercise in “small ball” summitry. Perennial issues such as trade, technology export restrictions, and Taiwan will be on the agenda. So, too, are likely to be emerging or emergent concerns including the regulation of artificial intelligence and the Iran war. Finally, on the agenda will be topics that have been addressed in relatively recent years or chronically across the near-half-century since Washington and Beijing normalized relations, such as China’s export of fentanyl and North Korea’s chronic—and at times acute—threat to regional security.
Significant breakthroughs are neither expected nor likely. First, the “trade truce” announced between the two leaders at Busan, South Korea, reduced economic tensions by lowering the mutual tariffs that had spiraled upward in the second Trump term and suspending the restrictions that Beijing had imposed on rare earth exports. As is often the case, there may well be announcements of specific promises, for example increased Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products or airplanes or a handful of Chinese investments in non-sensitive U.S. sectors. A formal extension of the trade truce is relatively likely. And while the creation of a “Board of Trade” may be announced to promise a more orderly framework for relations in a time of managed trade and “derisking,” the details will be left for a later day.
Second, progress on major items would require foundations that have yet to be built. Compared to the Board of Trade, a contemplated “Board of Investment” is inchoate and sure to be a much heavier lift, given plummeting Chinese investment in the United States, strict U.S. national security reviews, and skepticism in the United States toward Chinese analogs to the large (if often hollow) inbound investment deals Trump has announced with other states. Moving beyond existing, largely symbolic bilateral statements on AI—especially to address nettlesome issues such as chips and related technology exports and AI safety frameworks—is unattainable, at least absent future negotiations. Much the same is true about prospects for nuclear arms control in a time of rapidly increasing Chinese capabilities.
Third, neither side is prepared to acquiesce on some currently high-salience issues. Although the war in Iran has entailed economic pain for China and Beijing helped achieve the fragile ceasefire, Xi does not appear ready (or perhaps able) to exert the pressure on Tehran to make the accommodations that Trump seeks—not least because there are upsides for China in the U.S. distraction and dissipation of material and moral resources in a protracted war of choice. Beijing is unlikely to gain a significant concession toward Taiwan—such as a commitment to reduce U.S. arms sales or a statement that the United States “opposes” (rather than “does not support”) Taiwanese independence—in part because support for Taiwan and concern about China’s regional and global intentions remain robust in Washington.
Fourth, both leaders appear focused on short-term, superficial successes. For Trump, not being able to claim a summit “win” could be another blow to his effort to change an unfavorable political narrative in the run-up to U.S. midterm elections. For Xi, a poor summit outcome could reinforce domestic concerns that an already bad economic situation will get worse. It would also undermine China’s ardently cultivated image abroad as a supporter of international stability—a role the United States has pointedly shed under Trump.
Finally, the impetuses are weak on both sides to do, or risk, much. The expectation of multiple Xi-Trump meetings this year, including a reciprocal visit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and G20 gatherings, may overemphasize the need not to jeopardize relations and reduce the pressure to prearrange significant deliverables at any one meeting. Reflecting more fundamental features that will not be addressed at the summit, prospects for breakthroughs are dim because the Trump administration does not appear to have a coherent China policy or goals. For the Chinese, thoughts about striking deals must struggle in the shadow of an increasingly prevalent perspective that China is on the rise while the United States is in decline and that time, therefore, is on China’s side.
Amy E. Gadsden is the Associate Vice Provost for Global Initiatives, Executive Director of Penn China Initiatives, and Deputy Director of Penn Washington.
Empty-Handed and Full-Bellied? What to Expect from the Trump-Xi Summit
When President Trump and Premier Xi meet this week, analysts will be looking for signs of renewed stability in the relationship—stability in the U.S.-China trade relationship, stability in the Strait of Hormuz, stability across the Taiwan Strait, stability in the development of AI, and even stability for Chinese students pursuing their studies in the United States. But while aides will work overtime to achieve substantive outcomes from this meeting, China will look to use optics and atmospherics to woo the President, betting that an over-the-top welcome will set the stage for stabilizing the U.S.-China relationship.
Optics have always played a big role in U.S.-China relations. In 1972, Nixon and Kissinger famously sat down with Mao in his crowded study, sipping tea and making small talk with the ailing but formidable founder of the People’s Republic of China, a moment that showcased the American duo as strategic realists able to breakthrough entrenched Cold War enmity with light banter and cups of tea. Later in the visit, Nixon walked the Great Wall with his wife, Pat, by his side in a bright red coat, demonstrating strong cultural sensitivity, while introducing a bit of glamour that stood out in an entourage of overcoats and Mao suits. At the end of the visit the American president was all smiles as he toasted his Chinese hosts tipsily and declared that his week in China had changed the world. Fifty years later, we return to these images again and again as reminders of what is possible when leaders meet to chart a new course.
Chinamaxxing is all the rage now, with overseas social media feeds filled with images of “Made in China” humanoid robots dancing and doing Kungfu, and Gen Z influencers hyping typical Chinese lifestyle trends. Trump could very well boost the “Chinese baddie” hype this week as he sits down to a summit table sumptuously laid by the Chinese Communist Party. Images of Trump enjoying traditional and modern China are sure to flood screens over the next week. And analysts will put great store in any signs of warmth between the two leaders.
But this is where substance needs to win out over optics. As Nixon returned from China, one of the journalists who accompanied him summed up the summit outcomes by grousing, “They got Taiwan, we got eggrolls.” Let’s hope the Trump Administration does not similarly come away empty-handed and full-bellied this time around.
Jennifer Hendrixson-White is a Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow and a leading expert on national security issues related to the Indo-Pacific, foreign affairs and defense, international trade and economics, and emerging technologies.
Are Pharmaceutical Supply Chains on the Beijing Agenda?
When President Trump sits down with Xi Jinping in Beijing later this week, there will be no shortage of high-stakes issues on the table but the growing vulnerability of American pharmaceutical and biotech supply chains— a dependency on China that places the lives of millions of Americans at risk – probably won’t be.
Consider heparin, the anticoagulant used in virtually all U.S. hemodialysis and required for cardiac surgery, deep vein thrombosis treatment, pulmonary embolism, and most ICU protocols. More than half a million Americans depend on dialysis; for most of them, there is no substitute. Roughly 70 percent of the U.S. supply is sourced from porcine intestinal mucosa collected in thousands of small village workshops in China and consolidated before being shipped to API (active pharmaceutical ingredient) manufacturers. Both U.S.-based heparin API producers — SPL in Wisconsin and Smithfield BioScience in Ohio — are owned by Chinese parent companies.
Heparin is one drug. The issue of concentrated drug sourcing cannot be solved by a summit. But the meeting in Beijing is an opportunity for the President and his team to signal that pharmaceutical supply chains are a strategic vulnerability on par with critical minerals. And one with a direct impact on millions of Americans who would be one PRC export decision away from a crisis that Washington has no plan, or ability, to manage.
Neysun Mahboubi is Director of the Penn Project on the Future of U.S.-China Relations.
Beyond a Tactical Trade Truce?
On January 15, 2020, the United States and China signed a “Phase One” trade agreement, centered on Chinese purchasing commitments, that had been negotiated by the first Trump administration following its prosecution of a robust trade war against China over the preceding two years. At a conference on U.S.-China relations I attended in Seattle on the same day, a representative from Boeing highlighted—to much applause—that China was poised to make its first major order of their aircraft since 2017. As it happened, that also was the very day the individual who would later test positive for the first known case of COVID-19 in the United States landed at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, after visiting his family in Wuhan. One year later—after a profoundly tumultuous twelve months generally and for U.S.-China relations in particular—that order of Boeing aircraft and much more remained on hold, the Phase One trade agreement widely derided as a “flop.”
As I share these reflections on May 12, 2026, President Trump is set to arrive in Beijing tomorrow, joined by over fifteen American CEOs including Kelly Ortberg of Boeing, for his much anticipated two-day summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. A major new purchase of Boeing aircraft is almost certain to be announced, alongside other Chinese purchasing commitments that will hearken back to what was promised six years ago. A Rip Van Winkle figure who had gone to sleep in January 2020 and woken up today might be forgiven for thinking little has changed in the U.S.-China relationship in the intervening years.
Notwithstanding what is announced later this week, and the optics that accompany those pronouncements, it is important to recognize the sea change in U.S.-China relations that has now solidified, across three U.S. presidential administrations. After years of mutual reprisals, trust between the two governments is exceedingly low. The rupture in societal ties occasioned by the pandemic, especially in the educational sphere, remains pronounced. And disentangling the two economies continues to be the dominant trend. That growing separation—which began under the rubric of “decoupling” and progressed under the refined notion of “de-risking”—now seems more firmly ensconced than ever as the two governments negotiate the terms of a new “managed trade.” Indeed, by most accounts, the second Trump administration has given up on prompting real changes in Chinese economic practices, which had been the ostensible goal of the first Trump administration’s trade war and at least notionally anticipated by the “Phase Two” trade agreement promised to be on the horizon back in January 2020. A not-overly-hostile separation may be the best-case scenario.
Above all, hawks in Beijing and Washington, training their sights on the structural features of U.S.-China competition—and mindful of what can seem like irreconcilable differences on issues like the status of Taiwan—wait patiently on the sidelines of what they generally deem to be no more than a “tactical trade truce,” for the moment they expect it will inevitably fail. Scholars David Lampton and Wang Jisi recently have suggested that “this trajectory is not irreversible,” but even their hopeful vision is at best a highly measured entreaty to both sides, hardly a prediction.
Against this backdrop, and with a new round of complications occasioned by the war with Iran, what can this week’s summit really accomplish? It is easy to settle on a dark answer, for the time being. If there is any escape from that conclusion, it will rest not on factors we can predict, but on those we cannot—which, to be fair, has been more the norm than the exception over the past 150 years or so of the U.S.-China relationship. That may be a small comfort, for those who join Professors Lampton and Wang in hoping our two countries “step back from the brink,” but any student of that history will recognize it does exist, all the same.
Dan Schneiderman is the Director of Global Policy Programs at Penn Washington. He also serves as an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.
The Iran War’s Impact on Trump-Xi Summit
The Donald Trump – Xi Jinping summit—scheduled for May 14-15—and its potential pageantry belie what is the most likely desired outcome for both sides: the appearance of calm and stability, and the agreement to meet again soon (with a potential state visit for Xi to Washington in the offing). Both leaders probably want to project strength and achievement out of the summit; being able to point to commercial commitments around farming and major aircraft sales is probably the high-water mark of any dealmaking. There may be progress on the Board of Trade and Board of Investment concepts that are purportedly being discussed by the two sides. Beyond that, goals and expectations start to diverge, and real tensions start to emerge, particularly on Iran.
China’s intense reliance on Iranian oil will surely be a point of tension—and President Trump has indicated he intends to raise it with Xi. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said it is a topic on the agenda. The United States wants China to use its economic and political leverage with Tehran to convince them to make a deal to open the Strait of Hormuz and to agree to negotiations around their nuclear program.
It seems unlikely that China will do either. In reality, there’s no incentive rich enough for China to get them to invest significant political capital to make talks between the United States and Iran successful at this moment, despite China’s well-known distaste for instability and its impact on their strategic priority. There will also surely be some amongst the U.S. delegation agitating for the President to address the issue of purported Chinese supply of an advanced satellite to do sophisticated targeting of U.S. bases and airplanes in the Middle East as part of Iran’s war effort. Any conversation on Iran will be fraught, of course. Moments like the U.S. strikes on Bandar Abbas and the Qeshm Port on May 7 and the Iranian response is an example of the kind of thing that makes the likelihood of a return to open hostilities possible. Should that occur, it would almost certainly occasion another postponement, which neither side wants.
Thomas Shattuck is a Senior Program Manager for Security at Perry World House.
Do or Die for Taiwan?
Before the initial Trump-Xi summit was postponed due to the Iran conflict, there was much debate about the effect of the summit on the Trump administration’s Taiwan policy. Trump has delayed the approval of an arms sale package to Taiwan in an effort to secure the Beijing summit. That move is not unique to Trump—previous U.S. presidents have downgraded ties with Taiwan as a way to placate Beijing; the Obama administration followed a similar tact when trying to get China to agree on climate-related cooperation. Given the Trump administration’s focus on winning its war in the Middle East, I do not anticipate a major American concession related to Taiwan even though that’s priority number one for Xi Jinping. There is no incentive for Trump to make a huge policy concession for a trade deal. The failure of the trade deal during the first Trump administration should alert officials to the fact that Washington should not cede too much ground to Beijing until there’s clear progress and follow-through. But even then, is giving up Taiwan worth it for some sort of trade deal? I don’t think it will happen.
The true danger lies in Trump’s personal frustration with Taiwan and its semiconductor industry. In March 2025, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced a new major investment in their Arizona campus, and since then, Trump has not publicly complained as much about Taiwan stealing the industry from the United States. His next frustration is in his perception that Taiwan is not doing enough for its own self-defense. Considering the long delay in the passage of the special defense budget due to domestic political gridlock, that frustration is warranted. Again, I would argue that is not a good enough reason to bail on a longstanding U.S. partnership that has been a general value-add to the U.S. defense network in the Indo-Pacific. Trump can publicly complain about Taiwan in Beijing, which would be a net positive for Xi, without substantially changing concrete U.S. policy, which would be a win for Taipei. In fact, Trump complaining about Taiwan’s defense in Beijing could light a fire under members of the Legislative Yuan to pass the budget.
At the end of the day, the Taiwan issue not a top one for the Trump administration. He is focused on convincing China to do more to stop Iran and on getting a great trade deal. Xi wants concessions on Taiwan and less pressure from Trump on the economic side. It’s unlikely that either leader will leave with everything.
