Iran Weakened, Allies Strengthened, Foundation Laid for Diplomacy

The Trump administration enters office with an unprecedented opportunity to pursue its desired policy approach to Iran, perhaps with fewer constraints than any recent administration, built in large measure on the foundation of the actions taken during the Biden-Harris administration to advance U.S. interests, weaken Iran, strengthen alliances, and lay the foundation for pragmatic future diplomacy. 

First, the Iranian regime is severely weakened. Its proxies have been decimated by Israel throughout the region, from Hezbollah to Syria and further afield—with the support of the U.S. military presence and policy. This has prompted a rethink in Iran of its “Axis of Resistance” approach to defense and deterrence, according to statements by senior military and political officials. Following Iran’s unprecedented direct attacks against Israel, Iran’s air defenses, particularly those around sensitive military and nuclear sites, have similarly been destroyed. U.S. and coordinated international sanctions against the Iranian regime for nuclear, terrorism, human rights, election interference, cyber attacks and other issues remain in place. Because of these sanctions, corruption, and economic mismanagement, Iran’s economic conditions are staggeringly unstable—the value of the Rial continues to reach historic lows and inflation is at one of its sustained highs in recent memory. This domestic and regional weakness has created significant vulnerabilities for the Iranian regime.  

Second, the international community is united by its concern about Iran’s destabilizing actions. From the regime’s brutal human rights crackdown in the country to the blatant support for terrorism in the Middle East, from the continued nuclear escalations to statements by senior officials that the regime is considering changing its nuclear doctrine—countries in Europe and across the globe are more clear-eyed, and more united than they have been in years about the need to work together to address the challenge posed by Iran’s destabilizing actions, thanks in large measure to the close diplomatic engagement by the Biden-Harris Administration about the range of shared concerns.    

Third, there are structural timing factors creating incentives for diplomacy now. There are short-term and medium-term constraints that have not existed in years. In the immediate term, Iran’s defenses and inability to deter an Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities are severely diminished. There are time pressures to take advantage of these weaknesses—whether by initiating a strike, as some are publicly claiming, or utilizing this weakness as bargaining leverage before Iran is able to rebuild. In the medium term, the sunset of snapback in October 2025 is an equally significant milestone. The E3 has said publicly that if Iran has not struck a nuclear deal before then it will initiate snapback. Of course, this itself presents complications, given the state of the Security Council and other technical details. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said that it will produce a “comprehensive report” on Iran’s nuclear program and outstanding safeguards issues in the spring of 2025, in advance of this. While the report itself is not necessary to initiate snapback, its timing fits squarely within this timeframe. This calendar presents the clearest collective playing field for diplomatic engagement that all sides have had in some time. As such, it is commonly accepted wisdom that something has to happen before October. 

Much of this opportunity is a direct result of the policies of the Biden-Harris administration, which aimed to advance U.S. Middle East policy objectives by constraining Iran’s destabilizing activities, degrading Iran’s ability to threaten U.S. and regional interests, and enhancing partnerships to pragmatically keep a lid on further escalation in the region.  

Given a clear-eyed view of the Iranian regime’s escalations in its nuclear program and regional activities, policy focused on directly countering Iran’s full range of destabilizing activities.  

This is perhaps viewed as an evolution from the perception of the start of the Biden-Harris administration, during which a focus on a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the clearly articulated policy—and followed a series of developments that clearly constrained the diplomatic and political space for engagement. Iran’s destabilizing actions—including Iran’s decision to walk away from negotiations, the regime’s brutal crackdown on its own citizens during the Mahsa Amini protests and Women Life Freedom movement, an uptick in attacks by proxy groups against U.S. personnel in the region, the continued wrongful detention of U.S. citizens by the Iranian regime for hostage diplomacy, nuclear escalations—including the IAEA’s determination that Iran enriched uranium to 84 percent—and ultimately the October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel, which would not have been possible without Iran’s longstanding support for Hamas—made clear to not only the United States but also the international community that seeking to reach a deal in the immediate term at the expense of other policy objectives was not possible and not in the U.S. or global interest. 

This approach also aimed to put a lid of nuclear and other escalations, creating space to address additional priorities in the region—including securing a hostage deal and ceasefire in Israel and Gaza, avoiding the opening of a second or third front following the October 7 terrorist attacks—while continuing to build international support for efforts to ultimately address Iran’s nuclear program in a more meaningful way through diplomacy in the longer-term. Despite the Biden-Harris Administration saying that a return to the JCPOA was “no longer on the agenda” during this period of time, senior U.S. officials regularly reiterated that, ultimately, diplomacy was the only sustainable way to address Iran’s nuclear program.

This pragmatic policy was also forward looking, particularly with respect to timing constraints—not only regarding the aforementioned sunset of snapback in October 2025, but more importantly the November 2024 U.S. election. Iranian officials had made clear publicly that they were not interested in negotiating an enduring agreement until after the election when they knew who would be in the White House. As the U.S. election approached, leadership in Iran had also recently turned over (as a result of the untimely helicopter crash that killed the president and foreign minister), and several European countries, including the EU itself, also had leadership transitions.  This meant that following the U.S. elections all players would be in place for the foreseeable future—possibly allowing all sides to aim for some modicum of stability and longer-range diplomacy. It also foresaw a future hostage deal and ceasefire deal being reached between Israel and Hamas that would potentially create space down the line for the diplomatic  and political paths to negotiations with Iran.

As a result of the policies of the Biden-Harris Administration to achieve a hostage deal and ceasefire and create the conditions for a range of policy approaches to Iran, the question now becomes whether the incoming U.S. administration can take advantage of these conditions, constraints, and pressures to achieve a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear program, as has been suggested by President Trump? 

It remains to be seen how the United States, Iran, and the international community will approach this long-expected juncture. Will they take an offramp? Will they continue to escalate? At the moment, the future is unclear for a variety of factors.  

Iran appears to be posturing, aiming to increase its negotiating leverage. The regime appears to not yet have made up its collective mind about how best to approach what they have publicly described as the uncertainty of the Trump administration. There are voices calling for Iran to sprint ahead, revise its nuclear doctrine, and even potentially break out. There are voices aiming to project strength – especially in the face of the weaknesses mentioned above. There are voices seeking to outstretch a hand for diplomacy, in coordination with Europe and countries in the Middle East. 

Europe appears as uncertain as Iran, waiting to see how the Trump administration will approach Iran. However, unlike during the first Trump Administration, there is greater unity in Europe’s position—given the conditions and constraints outlined above that can be maximized for a successful outcome—due to efforts by the Biden-Harris administration to coordinate closely with its allies to address the full range of Iran’s destabilizing actions.  Instead of confronting the United States, Europe is watching and waiting for a nod from the new administration about how the international community should collectively proceed.  

While there are complexities both in the Middle East and globally that did not exist before—including the alignment of Iran, Russia, and China, at the same time, rapprochement between Iran and the region, especially the Gulf, presents new opportunities that did not previously exist, which has already borne itself out in these countries serving as unofficial go-betweens for the Trump administration and Iran in initial indirect outreach.  

It is now up to the incoming Trump administration to take advantage of these opportunities to advance an Iran policy that will address the full range of concerns about Tehran’s destabilizing activities, including by addressing the nuclear program in a sustainable way.