A Riddle, A Mystery, or An Enigma? The Legacy of the Islamic Republic and U.S.-Iran Relations

In 1939, on the cusp of the Second World War, the eminent British statesman Winston Churchill made the following statement about the Soviet Union in a radio broadcast: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” Despite the irony of invoking a British politician to analyze Iranian history and the trajectory of U.S.-Iran relations, I would argue that the same might be said of the Islamic Republic: that it, too, is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” Whether its raison d’être has indeed been one of “national interest”—especially in recent days—remains a matter of passionate debate.

Those who have chronicled the contact between Iran and America narrate a familiar outline of events: the arrival of missionaries; the establishment of embassies and businesses; World War II and the Allied occupation of Iran; the Musaddiq affair; and the hostage crisis. For much of this time, America and Iran nurtured a productive, though inherently problematic, “client-state” partnership. The Shah was beholden to the United States, but he and his people itched for some independence, especially when pursuing regional foreign policy.

Iranian politics has twice imposed itself upon the mainstream American psyche: the Mosaddeq débâcle and the hostage crisis. In 1953, the United States plotted to oust Iran’s popular prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, and to reinstate the shah. For many Iranians who spurned the Pahlavi regime, this was themoment of truth. America abandoned the people and chose instead to side with the king. 

Decades later, in 1979, Iranian students raided the American Embassy in Tehran. For Americans, this, too,was a moment of truth. The indignity of watching America’s diplomats blindfolded and held hostage by angry Iranian crowds radically transformed American impressions of Iran for the worse. 

Since then, a tense détente, punctuated by periodic rifts over regional security and politics, has characterized the two nations’ relationship. Today, the United States regards the Islamic Republic as a “dangerous” regime and “the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism.”  While this outcome has much to do with Iran’s behavior and rhetoric since 1979, it also stems in part from Iran’s rivals and detractors, who have sometimes skewed conversations about Iran in Washington’s policy circles to push for their competing interests. 

The regime’s suppression of political dissent and the image of “millionaire mullahs” have badly stained the intellectual legacy of a revolution undertaken in the name of the weak and the oppressed (mostaz‘af).

What now? A reckoning over the legacy of the revolution can put forth new objectives for diplomacy and mediation while paving the path for a prolonged and productive U.S.-Iran partnership. 

History

The past cannot change, but politics can. America and Iran should build on the history of cultural engagement that preceded the birth of the Islamic Republic. Decades-long educational projects (which included key linkages to Penn created new avenues for cultural contact and diplomacy. Many Iranians benefited from, and welcomed, this partnership, while others, similarly immersed in American politics, balked at this relationship. 

Many Iranian students in America who supported the revolution took for granted their privileges, leaving subsequent generations of young Iranians longing for the possibility of studying and working in the West—particularly the United States. Generational and political divides cleaved Iranian immigrant groups in America as they do today. Whatever their political proclivities, however, Iranian students overwhelmingly opt to gain acceptance to American universities. Many unconnected Iranians living in the Islamic Republic have a tough time obtaining U.S. visas to attend top American universities. Those who do are often suspected of having some ties to the regime’s elites, though these linkages are not always transparent or made public.

Accordingly, for struggling Iranians who face financial hardships and autocracy at home, history—and the Mosaddeq episode—are not the main sources of dissent anymore. While the Mosaddeq affair will always fester in most Iranian hearts as an unfortunate Anglo-American intervention—and justifiably so—it does not prevent a rapprochement. Rather, recent history has shown that many Iranian immigrants still gravitate toward the West, while the government maintains its strategic ties to the East (where Iran is situated). Thus, there is a ready audience unconnected to the regime’s elites who are eager for engagement and integration into Western (American) politics and society. 

Informal Interactions and Travel

Americans and Iranians need to interact with one another regularly in formal and informal ways. These interactions must transcend high-profile and choreographed opportunities to yield results. Such contact is impossible when Iranians cannot visit the United States or Americans fear imprisonment if they desire to visit the country. 

The snubbing of Iran (and of Iranians) has occurred in many ways since 1979, culminating in the Trump administration’s Muslim ban, which heavily targeted Iranians. That executive order built on previous immigration policies against Iran, such as the Carter administration’s requirement that Iranian students residing in the United States report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) during the hostage crisis. At the same time, American travel to Iran declined precipitously, and Iran’s high-profile arrests of several U.S. citizens or dual citizens visiting the country did not advance diplomacy or help the local tourism industry. Despite these hardships, many Iranian students willingly migrate abroad out of frustration with the policies of the Islamic Republic. This trend is a key indicator of the desire for political change and rapprochement with the United States.

Borders and Iran’s Encirclement

The birth of the Islamic Republic virtually coincided with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War—a conflict that coupled border security with the republic’s existence as a state. This bloody and costly war solidified the regime’s hold on the country and became its justification for the creation of a militarized state. 

The country’s territorial vulnerability and its history of boundary disputes with neighboring states—reinforced by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)—informs contemporary Iranian politics. With the remapping of the Middle East after World War I, Iran became encircled by states that asserted rival ethnolinguistic and religious identities in vying for regional hegemony. Its ethnolinguistic presence and cultural heritage were systematically erased through staunch programs of state nationalization in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and India. Iranians remain a minority community in the Middle East, and Iran does not have strong ethnolinguistic or political ties to its historical diaspora communities in Central Asia (as Turkey does), South Asia, the Levant, and the Persian Gulf (as Arab-dominant states do). Iran’s inability to capitalize on these historical linkages and minoritized populations has minimized its cultural influence at a time when its rivals have magnified their presence in contested terrain. To counter this cultural shift, the Islamic Republic has, instead, bolstered its Shia networks, but its policies have alienated minorities in Iran. Moreover, it remains highly unpopular in many parts of the Middle East and beyond. 

Calls by U.S. hawks to dismember or attack Iran on multiple fronts to destroy the “idea of Iran” nonetheless will not yield peace or the desired outcomes. While the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities have often been exaggerated to good effect, it can still stir up instability on multiple fronts, despite its limited military might, if its existence is at stake. The Islamic Republic may not win every battle along the country’s multiple frontiers, but it can ensure chaos for years to come. The United States cannot risk additional volatility in the Caucasus or Central Asia, in addition to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, by enabling further Russian aggression or expansion in those domains. That, too, poses an unintended security risk for the United States. Any change in U.S. diplomacy toward Iran thus requires a candid and reasonable consideration of these joint security threats, whatever the nature of Iran’s government.

The Nuclear Angle and the Economics of War

Iran entered the nuclear age with awe. It embarked on the path of atomic energy development with support from the Eisenhower administration and the Atoms for Peace program. The rupture in U.S.-Iran relations after 1979 ended this arrangement. Although the Islamic Republic cited religious fatwa, or pronouncements, to argue against the use of nuclear weapons, it developed nuclear reactors, most notably in Bushehr, Natanz, and elsewhere, which raised suspicions of Iran’s intentions.

The Islamic Republic’s nuclear threats have evolved over time. A signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, Iran has since threatened to leave this accord. Its position on nuclear arms has grown strident as its economic problems have multiplied. The U.S. sanctions, along with Iran’s vast expenditures in its proxy wars, have tanked the Iranian economy, as shown in the precipitous fall of Iran’s currency, the rial. Iranians unconnected to the regime’s elite find themselves under tremendous duress as their savings dwindle and the cost of living rises acutely. The low value of Iran’s rial contrasts sharply with the strong currencies of smaller countries in the region, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, whose currencies offer significant spending power, especially to purchase coveted American arms. 

The monumental international effort that went into the creation of the short-lived Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 2015 was perhaps the best example of a newfound reciprocal political understandingbetween the United States and Iran since 1979.  Yet its failure points to the need for ideological change for such treaties to succeed. 

It is unclear how determined the Trump administration will be to “bomb” Iran—a frequent Republican mantra—if the Islamic Republic does not respond to its overtures for a new nuclear deal. Still—after forty years, diplomatic bandages have failed to fix this relationship or to resolve the conundrum of Iran. Only significant ideological transformation will.

Change—What Can It Look Like?

Many Iranians justifiably clamor for change and sacrifice their lives for freedom, cultural openness, and economic prosperity—as witnessed in the dramatic Woman, Life, Freedom uprisings. The regime cannot survive by killing and imprisoning its citizens, placing its women and minority communities under duress, spewing rhetoric of hate, and crushing dissent. However, the rise of censorship in America and the limits on academic freedom here have emboldened hardliners in Iran to continue their state repression with impunity. 

The rapid silencing and dismantlement of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in the West has revealed the strong network of pro-revolutionary—if in some instances also anti-regime—supporters inside and outside the country who have strong ties to universities and the media. The checkered legacy of the revolution has become entwined with the future of Iran, and this tug-of-war became exposed in the Western coverage of the Islamic Republic during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprisings.

No easy way exists to reconcile America’s ambitions and Iran’s regional vision. Only a new constitutional framework can promise a different political outlook for Iran and allow the possibility of rapprochement with the United States.