The Iran-Russia-China partnership is often portrayed as a cohesive bloc resisting U.S. hegemony. While there is some truth to this narrative, it is frequently overstated. In recent years, Iran has joined institutions widely seen as counterweights to Western influence—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS—and is set to enter a free trade agreement with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union in May 2025. Meanwhile, China remains Iran’s primary, and often only, major oil customer. On the surface, these developments suggest strategic alignment. But a closer look reveals a relationship driven more by pragmatic opportunism than ideological solidarity or durable alliance.
For both Moscow and Beijing, engagement with Tehran is shaped by cost-benefit calculations rather than loyalty. There is no shortage of instances where Russia and China, separately or together, have drawn clear lines and denied Iran unconditional support. Iranian officials are keenly aware of this transactional dynamic. Yet for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iran’s ruling elite, ties with these two powers are still seen as a crucial hedge against U.S. pressure.
Critics within Iran increasingly contend that this Eastward tilt is fundamentally flawed. While Moscow and Beijing may offer tactical support to counterbalance Western dominance, neither is willing to jeopardize core national interests for Iran’s sake. Strategic partnership, in this context, remains shallow, conditional, and often one-sided.
As the Middle East is reshaped by Gulf Arab ascendancy and evolving global alignments, Iran’s continued reliance on its Look East policy risks strategic marginalization. Critics argue that Tehran must recalibrate—pursuing a more balanced foreign policy that includes engagement with the West, even under unpredictable figures such as U.S. President Donald Trump.
Khamenei’s eastward vision
Iran has long been an outlier in its regional environment: a non-Arab, Persian, and Shia-majority state in a predominantly Sunni and Arab Middle East. Since the 1979 revolution, its anti-American Islamist ideology has further reinforced its isolation—especially in a region where many governments still view the United States as a guarantor of stability despite its blunders such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. To compensate for this geopolitical solitude, Tehran has sought strategic alternatives—and no one has pursued this more fervently than Khamenei.
The roots of Khamenei’s Look East strategy lie in his enduring distrust of the United States. Since the 1990s, this policy has aimed to balance U.S. pressure with support from powers like Russia and China. In 2001, Iran signed a 20-year strategic agreement with Russia; in 2021, it inked a 25-year cooperation deal with China. Yet both agreements have yielded, at best, modest and uneven outcomes from Tehran’s perspective.
Time and again, Russia and China have demonstrated clear limits to their support. Between 2006 and 2010, both backed UN sanctions targeting Iran. After the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, China slashed its oil imports from Iran. Before then, Russia had delayed arms sales like the S-300 air defense system—twice. Even in the Syrian civil war, where tactical coordination occurred, many in Tehran concluded that Moscow acted chiefly in its own interests even it undermined Tehran. In the end, Russia appeared more of a fair-weather partner than a steadfast ally.
In short, Khamenei has anchored Iran’s foreign policy to powers that share a rejection of the Western-led order—but neither Russia nor China has been willing to underwrite Iran’s economic or security survival. At best, they help Tehran stay afloat—so long as doing so doesn’t draw them into direct confrontation with Washington or threaten their own strategic interests.
Iran, taken for granted by Russia and China
A big test for Iran’s so-called strategic ties with Russia and China came in 2024 as Iran and Israel for the first time openly attacked each other. After Israel struck sensitive sites in multiple locations in April and October, including Russian-supplied S-300 anti-air systems, Moscow did not categorially condemned Israel’s attacks.
Even Tehran’s anti-U.S. hardliners could not ignore this reality. A choreographed press conference saw Iranian journalists accuse Russia of dishonorable duplicity. Critics inside Iran openly questioned why Russia, supposedly a “strategic partner,” failed to condemn the attack while countries like Switzerland, Oman, and many others did.
The cynical view in Tehran holds that from Moscow’s perspective, a tense but manageable Iran-Israel rivalry is useful leverage against the West. Controlled instability in the Middle East allows Russia to use Iran as a bargaining chip—without ever offering real protection. In fact, many Iranian observers believe that Putin benefits not only from Iranian tension with Israel, but also from its tensions with such countries as Azerbaijan, the Gulf states and Western states but he won’t intervene decisively. As one Iranian analyst put it, “Russia can change its alliances within 24 hours.” That is not the foundation of a strategic partnership.
China, for its part, treads carefully. It condemned Israel weakly after its October strike but avoids angering the United States or Arab partners. Tehran is useful to Beijing—as an energy source (that sells oil at a discounted rate) and sanctions-evading partner—but not indispensable. China won’t jeopardize its global ambitions for Iran’s sake.
A strategic reckoning awaits
Iran’s current path is unsustainable. Khamenei’s decades-long effort to create an anti-Western coalition has produced no reliable allies. Both Moscow and Beijing may help Iran evade sanctions or buy time—but they will not fight its battles, absorb its risks, or rescue its economy because they cannot (Russia) or unwilling to risk too much to do so (China). Meanwhile, Iran’s neighbors are moving forward—diversifying partnerships, modernizing militaries, and leveraging their geostrategic value. It pains the Iranians to see that both Russia and China have significantly greater economic ties with the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Turkey, than they do with Iran.
With the possibility of a new nuclear deal with the Trump administration, Iran has an opening—but only if it recognizes the limits of “Look East” and pursues a strategic rebalancing. Tehran must revive dialogue with the West, attempt to reintegrate into the global economy, and abandon the illusion that China or Russia will save the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s recent full membership in BRICS and SCO is hailed by its leadership as proof of emerging multipolarity. President Masoud Pezeshkian even proposed a BRICS roadmap to de-dollarize energy trade and neutralize Western sanctions. But despite the rhetoric, neither bloc is ready to confront the U.S.-led financial order directly. Many BRICS and SCO members, including India, Brazil, and the UAE, prioritize balanced relations with the West. Furthermore, the Gulf states have joined these platforms to hedge against U.S. decline—not to align with Iran. Their presence in SCO/BRICS is as much about limiting Tehran’s influence as it is about diversifying their own partnerships.
In short, the Islamic Republic’s belief that it belongs to a rising anti-Western bloc is more ideological assertion than strategic reality—and one increasingly out of step with the world’s evolving power dynamics. Moscow and Beijing have consistently prioritized their own global interests over any lasting commitment to Tehran. What may look like an emerging axis is, in practice, a transactional and asymmetric relationship—with Iran as the junior, and often disposable, partner. If Tehran continues to stake its future on assumed support from Russia and China, it risks deeper isolation, declining regional relevance, and a weakening of its strategic hand.
