Thwarting of Order in the Indo-Pacific: A Potential Outlook for the Region

May 19, 2025
By Jennifer Hong Whetsell

The Indo-Pacific is emerging as the world’s most consequential geopolitical arena, and over the next five years, events within the region have the potential to upend or rearrange the global order. Central to this dynamic will be the United States, whose foreign policy orientation—whether toward isolationism, globalism, or an Indo-Pacific-centric strategy—will shape the landscape. Although positive developments are possible if the United States maintains an Indo-Pacific focus, unplanned events, particularly those driven by hostile state actors, accidental fatalities, and domestic political upheaval, could significantly destabilize the region.

The United States: An Agent for Catalyst

To project the potential future of the Indo-Pacific, one should consider three possible trajectories for U.S. foreign policy posture under President Donald Trump: isolationism, globalism, and Indo-Pacific-centered engagement. Under isolationism, the United States would retreat from international commitments, dismantle multilateral relationships, and prioritize domestic resilience. Signs of this shift have already appeared during the Trump administration through tariffs destabilizing global markets, pressuring allies for increased defense spending, devaluing multilateral forums, expressing territorial ambitions for Greenland, Panama, and Gaza, and the onshoring of critical industries. These moves, paired with stringent immigration curbs, suggest a partial decoupling from global entanglements.

Conversely, tendencies toward globalism persist. The United States remains engaged in the Russia-Ukraine war and continues to exert influence in the Middle East, despite efforts to pivot away from these regions. The difficulty in extracting from these theaters hints at the inertia of globalism, whereby U.S. foreign policy remains reactionary and overstretched.

However, the most likely and deliberate orientation appears to be an Indo-Pacific-focused strategy. Early signs include the Quad ministerial meeting held on Day 1 of the administration, reinforcing security cooperation among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Visits by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi of India and Shigeru Ishiba of Japan have happened early and without any visible disasters, signaling strong bilateral ties and commitment to the bilateral relationships. The interim National Defense guidelines have explicitly identified the People’s Republic of China as the principal threat, and U.S. allies in the region are being urged to enhance their military contributions, including increasing Access, Basing, and Overflight (ABO) arrangements.

Furthermore, influential voices inside the Department of Defense, like Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, advocate for a withdrawal from Ukraine to concentrate resources on countering China. Secretary Pete Hegseth’s visits to the Philippines and Japan reaffirm commitments to expanded training, defense industrial cooperation, and significant upgrades in military capabilities, such as the buildup of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in the Philippines and strengthening of U.S.-Japan operational structures. Notably, the absence of destabilizing moves—such as dismantling AUKUS or renegotiating status of forces agreements (SOFA)—further confirms the Indo-Pacific remains a central focus to the Trump administration.

Positive Impacts of an Indo-Pacific Focus

If the United States maintains its current trajectory, several positive outcomes could bolster regional stability:

  • Enhanced Deterrence: Deployment of nuclear submarines to the region would significantly strengthen the military balance.
  • Defense Industrial Cooperation: Collaborations with Korea, Japan, and the Philippines to expand shipbuilding capacity could sustain U.S. and allied naval strength.
  • Critical Mineral Supply Chains: Efforts to secure materials essential for modern industries would reduce dependency on adversarial states.
  • Friendshoring Investments: Redirecting economic investments toward trusted partners would solidify strategic alliances.
  • Elevated Role of Taiwan: Advancing Taiwan’s status in international organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) would reinforce U.S.’s support for a key player in the region.

These measures would, collectively, present a robust front against regional destabilization, increasing the costs for any aggressive moves by China or its partners.

Risks of U.S.’s Increased Attention for the Indo-Pacific

Nevertheless, the U.S.’s increased focus on the Indo-Pacific will not inoculate the region from destabilization. Three primary risks loom large: the coordinated actions of hostile powers, accidental fatalities, and destabilizing domestic political dynamics that could lead to unintended consequences. 

The Axis of Destabilizers

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—states bound together more by a shared opposition to the liberal international order than by common political ideology—will actively seek to undermine U.S. efforts. Their cooperation in sustaining the Russia-Ukraine war exemplifies their strategic convergence. China’s “limitless partnership” with Russia, North Korea’s provision of soldiers and munitions in exchange for food and technology, and Iranian destabilization efforts in the Middle East all aim to distract and thin U.S. resources.

Under the guise of thwarting the Western-led order, they will pursue multiple avenues to challenge the U.S. leadership and presence:

  • Nuclear Posturing: North Korea’s missile tests demonstrate both technological advancements and psychological gaming, reminding the world of its disruptive potential. Russia will continue to evoke its nuclear capability when provoking regional order. China will continue to grow its arsenal to challenge the U.S. nuclear prowess. 
  • Economic Disruption: Expansion of BRICS-like forums and moves to abandon diplomatic relations with Taipei (in favor of Beijing) erode the foundations of rules-based systems.
  • Instability in the Middle East: Continued instability, encouraged by Iran and its proxies, will demand U.S. attention away from the Indo-Pacific.

The shared strategy is clear: keep the United States engaged in multiple conflicts to prevent it from concentrating forces in the Indo-Pacific.

Accidental Fatalities and Escalation

The increased presence of U.S. and allied forces raises the probability of unplanned confrontations, particularly in sensitive areas like the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Dangerous maneuvers by Chinese Coast Guard vessels during resupply missions at Second Thomas Shoal, or provocative crossings of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by People’s Liberation Army (PLA)  aircraft, could trigger accidents that rapidly escalate into broader conflicts.

One particularly concerning scenario is the potential for a blockade or quarantine of Taiwan. Though an amphibious invasion before 2029 seems unlikely, a blockade enforced by the Chinese Coast Guard would entangle commercial shipping, forcing escalated responses from multiple nations. Such actions could lead to miscalculations, accidental fatalities, and demands for U.S. intervention. Each incident of escalation raises the probability of misinterpretation and unintended war. 

Domestic Political Volatility

Domestic politics across key regional states, and within the United States itself, add another layer of unpredictability:

  • Elections and Leadership Changes: Korea, Australia, Japan, and Taiwan will undergo presidential and/or parliamentary elections. As economic, political, and military tensions rise, voters may gravitate toward candidates with extreme views and values, whose platforms may not favor regional alignment and likeness of minds among leaders. 
  • AUKUS Fragility: Australia’s domestic debates over the AUKUS pact, stemming from doubts about the U.S. capacity to deliver, could undermine this crucial alliance. In addition, while the Trump administration has not backed out of this agreement, domestic pressures to maintain U.S. Navy’s competitiveness may delay the delivery of the promised Virginia-class submarines. 
  • Korea-Japan Tensions: Despite the recent cooperation under President Yoon Suk Yeol and Prime Minister Fumio Kishiba, deep-seated historical grievances remain a fire-inducing pawn in domestic politics. A deterioration of Korea-Japan ties under a new administration in Korea and beleaguered Japanese prime minister would weaken U.S. strategic positioning.

Thus, political shifts at home and abroad have the potential to seriously complicate U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategies. 

Conclusion: Navigating an Uncertain Future

The Indo-Pacific region stands at a critical juncture. Over the next five years, the strategic orientation of the United States will profoundly influence whether the region tilts toward stability or chaos. While a focused U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific could deter aggression and reinforce a rules-based order, unpredictable events remain a looming threat.

The coordinated efforts of the Axis of Destabilizers, accidental fatalities, and domestic political upheavals could easily upend even the most well-intentioned plans. Policymakers must prepare not just for the expected, but for the unexpected. The stakes for the Indo-Pacific, and indeed the broader global order, could not be higher.

About the author

Jennifer Hong Whetsell is Senior Director at the Project 2049 Institute and Managing Director at Pacific Solutions.