Immigration is one of the most politically charged aspects of human rights law as states regard the ability to control their own borders as essential to their sovereignty. This attachment to border control is something that largely emerged in the twentieth century, during which law started ‘to exert its authority on migration’ and ‘become the key site for demarcating the rules of inclusion and exclusion of migrants’. International law followed suit in initially adopting the permissive view of migration and later deferring to states’ domestic law. Today international human rights law strives to strike a delicate balance in protecting rights whilst also respecting state sovereignty. Thus, state sovereignty often features heavily in human rights law relating to immigration, see, for example, the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regularly Migration which:

“reaffirms the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law. Within their sovereign jurisdiction, States may distinguish between regular and irregular migration status, including as they determine their legislative and policy measures for the implementation of the Global Compact, taking into account different national realities, policies, priorities and requirements for entry, residence and work, in accordance with international law”

State sovereignty is also prominent in the human rights case law. For example, whilst the European Court of HumanRights (ECtHR) has found violations in many migration-related cases and faced significant political backlash from states as a result; it has also been extensively criticized by scholars and NGOs for deferring too readily to state sovereignty and for being complicit in legitimizing harmful states’ practices. In this regard former Judge of the ECtHR Pinto de Albuquerque has made the following extra-judicial comments:

“Migration will not go away, and as we watch the world become increasingly more volatile, we must expect thatwaves of migrations will continue to bring many more vulnerable and desperate people to our shores. The Courtwill have to reflect on its role in protecting individuals who have come to Europe and managed to create a lifehere, only to have their lives upturned by arbitrary deportations. The Court will also have to consider its role in condoning an inhuman detention policy which treats migrants as disposable commodities. The Court is on awrong path: one away from protection, and towards indifference. The implications of this are tragic, not only for individuals who have no other protection but the Convention, but also for the protection and development of human rights across Europe and the world.“

Migration and the Human Rights Law Framework

Various human rights obligations apply when migrants are pushed back, returned, deported, or moved to a third state. These rights derive from a range of sources including UN treaties, regional treaties, general principles of law and customary international law. Thus, as the UN has observed:

“International borders are not zones of exclusion or exception for human rights obligations. States are entitled to exercise jurisdiction at their international borders, but they must do so in light of their human rights obligations.”

Which obligations arise depends upon which state is seeking to remove the migrant from its territory, which treaties it has ratified, where the migrant will be sent, and any agreements reached between the sending and receiving state. Moreover, whilst there are legal obligations the UN recognizes that it is ‘increasingly clear that a lack of human rights-based migration governance at the global and national levels is leading to the routine violation of migrants’ rights in transit, at international borders, and in the countries they migrate to.’

When is return prohibited by human rights law?

States seek to “return” migrants in a wide range of circumstances ranging from preventing migrants from entering their territory in the first place through to returning people who have been living in the state for a long-time, including in some cases persons who were born in the state. The term “return” is thus an umbrella one which encompasses both voluntary and involuntary or forced returns (i.e. deportations, expulsions, removals). Challenges to returns may include arguments based on rights such as the right to respect for life, the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, the prohibition of collective expulsion and the right to respect for private and family life. Human rights issues may also arise in respect of the conduct of the return, e.g. where force is used, as well as the conditions (but not necessarily the duration) of immigration detention.

The most stringent restriction on returns is the prohibition of refoulement. The principle of non-refoulement is recognized as customary international law as well as within many international treaties including the ICCPR, CAT, CRC, CEDAW, CERD, CED and under regional treaties such as the ECHR. It provides that states cannot return a person where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be a risk of irreparable harm, including persecution, torture or ill-treatment. The principle applies regardless of the migration status of the individual. It also applies where the risk stems from private parties in the receiving state, or where the receiving state may transfer the person to another state where they would be at risk.

The principle of non-refoulement and rights such as Article 3 ECHR (the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment) have been used to prevent the return of migrants at risk of receiving the death penalty; inadequate healthcare; or a whole life sentence with no prospect of parole.

Where the obligation arises it applies regardless of the national security interests of either the sending state or the receiving state. Thus the obligation applies in both expulsion cases and in extradition cases. In this respect it is an absolute prohibition, however, in some cases it may be possible for states to return a migrant if e.g. they have suitable assurances from the receiving state.

Human rights law also prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens.This is important in the context of state practices known as ‘pushbacks’, which the UN Special Rapporteur has described as:

“various measures taken by States which result in migrants, including asylum seekers, being summarily forced back to the country from where they attempted to cross or have crossed an international border without access to international protection or asylum procedures or denied of any individual assessment on their protection needs which may lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement.”

The prohibition on collective expulsion is also purported to be absolute, however, the ECtHR has limited the ambit of the prohibition by invoking a doctrine based on the applicant’s “own conduct” when determining whether the right is applicable.

Human rights courts are receiving an increasing number of cases in relation to pushbacks. In January 2025 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found strong indications of systematic pushbacks from Greece to Türkiye and that the applicant had been sent back without a prior examination of the risks she faced on her return. A potentially landmark case currently before the Grand Chamber concerns the use of pushbacks at the EU’s external border, this consists of three cases being heard together in which Poland, Latvia and Lithuania all argue that pushbacks are necessary as Belarus and Russia are “instrumentalising” migrants against the EU and the Council of Europe. If those arguments are accepted then they will have significant inroads into the purportedly absolute prohibitions of refoulement and pushbacks.

Given the prohibition on refoulment and collective expulsion one of the practices that some states are turning to are third country agreements in which the state reduces immigration in its own territory by sending migrants to a third country that has agreed to take them. Such practices can be lawful or unlawful and in this respect the UNHCR—the UN Refugee Agency distinguishes between what it terms “externalization practices” (which are unlawful) and “lawful practices.” Externalization practices “involve inadequate safeguards to guarantee international protection as well as shifting responsibility for identifying or meting international protection needs to another state or leaving such needs unmet.” Conversely lawful transfers are in accordance with international standards, regulated and implemented in the spirit of international cooperation with adequate safeguards and guarantees to ensure respect for rights. Various third country agreements have been the subject of legal challenge including agreements entered into by Italy, Australia and Canada. In the UK, the recently failed Rwanda partnership agreement was condemned by the UNHCR and found to be unlawful by the UK Supreme Court, but the agreement was only brought to an end by a change of government.

Another potentially important component of the human rights law framework for migrants residing within a state who are facing deportation or expulsion is the protection accorded by the right to respect for private and family life. There is extensive case law on this under the ECHR, as well as case law under the ICCPR and CRC. These rights have a far broader remit than non-refoulement and the threshold for engaging the rights is lower. The rights are thus usually applicable where the migrant has been residing for some time in the state and faces deportation following a conviction.Yet the mere fact that the rights are engaged does not, mean that the applicant will succeed in resisting expulsion, unlike non- refoulement which is absolute, these are qualified rights and states can (and often do) justify interfering with theserights. Thus, in practice few applicants succeed in using these rights to resist deportation even in cases where they wereborn or lived almost their entire life in the state. This is where the criticism that human rights law prioritises state sovereignty over and above the rights often bites. Moreover there is often a colonial context to many of the cases, giving rise to questions about who benefits from human rights law. Where the rights are most likely to succeed is in cases involving children where additional obligations apply based on the “best interests” of the child, but even in these cases there is no guarantee.

Conclusion

There are many important human rights laws applicable to migration which set limits on states but are frequently violated in practice. Human rights institutions have found violations of the rights on many occasions, but the interpretation of the rights is constantly being challenged and shaped by state practices as well as state interpretations and reinterpretations of rights. The parameters of human rights, including even purportedly absolute rights, are thus constantly being tested and are potentially fragile.

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