When considering the future of Indo-Pacific security and minilateralism in the Indian Ocean, we should first clarify which minilaterals we are talking about, what they are working on, and to what end. International engagement sometimes risks devolving into a series of “talk shop” meetings and joint statements. Moreover, there are already many existing multilateral organizations in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, a constructive way to think about minilaterals is in terms of their strategic- and operational-level objectives.
At roughly three months in office, the second Donald Trump administration has already given some indications of its approaches to U.S. security engagement overseas. Defending the homeland, protecting U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, and deterring the People’s Republic of China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific appear to be top priorities. By the end of the first Trump administration, there was evidence of these priorities, but attention has clearly intensified this time around.
Given the Trump administration’s “America First” approach to prioritizing foreign policy objectives and justifying program spending, it is not fully clear what role minilaterals will play. U.S. participation in minilaterals can be only as effective as their perceived utility to the United States in an era of more skepticism about monetary and human resources directed toward international engagement.
The Quad, I2U2, IMEC, and “plurilateral anchor partnerships”
The Quad minilateral appears likely to remain the primary vehicle for senior-level U.S. engagement across the Indo-Pacific. The first Trump administration resurrected the Quad—the United States, India, Japan, and Australia—after roughly a decade of dormancy and in the context of China’s increasingly assertive activities. The Biden administration continued and augmented U.S. participation to the leadership level. The strategic-level focus has been on countering China, while the operational-level objective is the delivery of public goods. From its early days, the second Trump administration has demonstrated its interest in continuing U.S. engagement with the Quad. In fact, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Quad counterparts on his first day in office in January 2025.
Even bilaterally, the Quad was prominently highlighted in the United States-India Joint Leaders’ Statement issued after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the White House in February 2025. President Trump is expected to travel to India to participate in the Quad leaders’ summit later this year. The period before the summit will “activate new Quad initiatives on shared airlift capacity to support civilian response to natural disasters and maritime patrols to improve interoperability,” according to the joint statement.
While the inclusion of India in the Quad ostensibly covers the “Indo” part of the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. effort behind the Quad appears to have been largely driven by a focus on the Pacific theater. This is understandable given the presence of U.S. states, territories, and allies, combined with China’s aggression in the waters of the Pacific. In addition to the multilateral and minilateral architecture focused on the Pacific, much U.S. messaging across previous administrations has concerned this theater.
Within the Quad, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) has to date seen more progress in the Pacific theater than in the Indian Ocean. An example of its work is at the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency in Solomon Islands. Of the Quad members, India is naturally the most intent to focus on the Indian Ocean segment of the Indo-Pacific, particularly the western Indian Ocean. India’s role in the security services of Mauritius and its wider interests in the East African littoral suggest that the Quad could see more attention placed on minilateral cooperation with island partners in the western Indian Ocean. Later in 2025, India plans to execute its first engagement of the Quad’s Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI), which aims to strengthen smaller states’ maritime forces and capacities.
The Quad has not been the only focus of minilateral cooperation in the Indian Ocean by the Trump administration. In their February 2025 joint statement, the United States and India made clear their intention to work on two additional groupings with Indian Ocean equities: the I2U2 Group comprising India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). Both are expected to launch new initiatives this year. In addition to these minilateral efforts, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi discussed their desire in February to “build new plurilateral anchor partnerships” (emphasis added) in the western Indian Ocean and Middle East, in addition to the Indo-Pacific. Although the current hostilities in the Middle East could undercut progress, the initiatives are expected to be announced by Fall 2025.
Looking Ahead
The United States has outlined an ambitious agenda for itself bilaterally and minilaterally with India and other partners. It is worth noting some considerations and questions going forward that could affect the future of Indo-Pacific security. First, policymakers and experts will need to study the outputs of the above efforts to determine the extent to which U.S. national interests are being achieved with these minilateral initiatives. For the foreseeable future, the United States appears to be aligned with a course of action in which India is the net security provider in the Indian Ocean and assumes more burden-sharing. In fact, this view of India has arguably guided U.S. strategy and policy toward Asia for roughly the past two decades. While there is currently much discussion about burden-sharing and burden-shifting, Washington may find there are some responsibilities and options it does not want to give up—thereby preferring a “burden-shouldering” stance. Thinking through the implications of burden-sharing and burden-shifting and weighing associated risks will be important for the administration to prevent unintended outcomes in the Indian Ocean.
Second, the United States may have capacity challenges given staffing reductions in key offices tasked with security strategy development and policy implementation. To what extent the Trump administration can deliver on an ambitious minilaterals agenda—such as the Quad’s initiatives on cyber security and space situational awareness, as well as I2U2 and IMEC—remains to be seen. Questions about U.S. capacity in the region, in addition to wider strategic priorities and force posture, are yet to be answered.
Third, the Quad was originally borne out of diplomatic and military coordination in the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Yet, despite the early momentum of the Quad foreign ministers meeting that the Trump administration organized in January, the Quad did not quickly issue a statement or convey evidence of member consultation after an earthquake struck Myanmar in March. A full week went by before the Quad issued a statement, and there have been no updates at the time of writing.
Meanwhile, India promptly delivered bilateral relief through its Navy, Air Force, and Army services and National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) within its Ministry of Home Affairs. The United States initially announced a total of $2 million (and subsequently $9 million) in assistance and the deployment of a USAID team to Myanmar, although the team reportedly faced challenges upon arrival. Given the signed Guidelines for the Quad Partnership on HADR in the Indo-Pacific, an open question is why the Quad did not immediately appear to have coordinated on response operations to the natural disaster.
Fourth, issues elsewhere in the U.S.-India bilateral relationship and over differences in national policies could complicate minilateral coordination. For example, the U.S.’s new approach to trade and migration from India could over time erode security relations. Meanwhile, it is not clear how useful the Quad will be in achieving the U.S. objective of deterring China. Even as the border dispute between India and China has escalated since 2020, New Delhi’s reluctance to antagonize Beijing via the Quad has moderated the group’s ability to counter China.
Taken together, these factors and uncertainties have significant implications for how the Trump administration chooses to build out its approach to minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific and specifically in the Indian Ocean. Assuming sufficient resources, the Quad looks to offer many opportunities for the administration to take interest such as advancing the Quad Investors Network (QUIN) on critical and emerging technologies as well as bolstering maritime and supply-chain security. Yet, to what extent the Quad continues to be perceived by the new administration as having utility for the United States and how many financial and staffing resources the administration is willing to allocate toward the Quad—compared with other priorities like the Western Hemisphere—remain to be seen.
