Understanding the U.S.-China Summit in Washington: A Perry World House Q&A
Following the post-UNGA summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington, Perry World House asked some of our experts for their takeaways from the bilateral meeting.
Flipping the Script at a Seemingly Uneventful Summit
Like Trump’s trip to Beijing in May, Xi’s visit to Washington yielded no dramatic breakthroughs. The trade truce announced when the two leaders met in Busan was extended, but only by two months, and promises to reduce some tariffs followed. Sustaining the relative stability in bilateral relations that has followed the retrenchment of Trump’s tariffs and China’s relaxation of restrictions on rare earths exports appeared to be the primary goal and principal achievement. Many of the unresolved issues were chronic concerns, including: for the United States, intellectual property protection (increasingly focused on AI), Chinese purchases of U.S. exports (including agricultural goods and airplanes), and U.S. firms’ access to business opportunities in China; for China, U.S. restrictions on technology exports, barriers to Chinese exports, and support for Taiwan.
More recently, arising questions loomed as well, including AI safety, fragility in both economies, and the securitization of economic relations. But more fundamental changes lie in the broader script flipping, increasingly, in Beijing’s favor, as a resulting of both long-term trends and Trump’s choices. Xi’s now-familiar invocation of the Thucydides trap—warning of the dangers of conflict between a rising China and a relatively declining United States—asserted and reflected China’s sense of itself as a peer power. Trump’s unrequited touting of a great personal relationship with Xi, greeting Xi on arrival at Joint Base Andrews, and pointedly eschewing criticism of Chinese actions that threaten U.S. interests, as well as the broader tenure of the leaders’ interactions, seemed to reinforce the point. The close relationship with allies that had long enhanced a power imbalance in the United States’s favor has been severely damaged under Trump—a point underscored by world leaders’ speeches at the UN General Assembly on the eve of Xi’s White House visit. So, too, Trump’s expressed preference for a press corps as docile as China’s, dismissal of Chinese spying and sharing satellite imagery with Iran as no worse than what the United States does, and refusal to press cases of detainees and raise other human rights issues underscored the Trump administration turn away from “values” that the United States (albeit inconsistently) has pressed with China and relied upon as a basis for rallying like-minded states.
In contrast to the days when the United States cajoled China to be a “responsible stakeholder,” Xi spoke of the need for human control over AI while Trump dismissed worries about the need for regulation to address the risks posed by “superintelligence.” The juxtaposition resonated with China’s growing presentation of itself as a source of stability and cooperation in an international order facing undermining by the United States and Trump’s erratic policies and transactional style. These patterns and trends bode ill for the protection and advancement of U.S. interests, especially in the many areas where they do not align with China’s.
Pandas and Bok Choy
By Amy Gadsden
One week after the Trump-Xi Summit, we have a better sense of what the meetings did and did not achieve. Checked off as deliverables: China’s promised pandas arrived in Atlanta over the weekend, and the United States announced an AI crisis “red phone,” a charmingly antiquated concept for our fast-moving cyber age. There were no major gaffes, a source of relief to both sides. At the end of the day, the summit met the low expectations that were set.
If only the future of U.S.-China competition looked as banal as the summit did. There is no shortage of intractable issues facing the United States and China – the problems of slow economic growth in China, the potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the enduring sting of America’s loss of manufacturing to China, wars in Ukraine and Iran that may only be resolved with Sino-U.S. cooperation, the mind-bending concerns about managing artificial intelligence, the detention of political prisoners like Hong Kong’s Jimmy Lai and UC Berkeley’s U Min Zin, to name a few – but when our leaders meet we hear about pandas and plates of bok choy.
Perhaps the most important news, and the one less covered, is that tariff truce has been extended for two months beyond its expiration in November. The extension compels both sides to continue meeting to work through trade issues, likely not at the summit level with all its pomp and pandas, but at the working level. That kind of retail diplomacy between the United States and China has been lacking and is arguably what is most needed. Maybe the prospect of rebuilding our diplomatic muscle memory is enough progress for now.
Keeping the Waters Calm
This week’s U.S.-China summit seems to have been light on substantive outcomes outside of Presidents Trump and Xi agreeing to a two-month extension of their tariff truce. Both leaders are clearly trying to keep things in the bilateral relationship from becoming more tense as they both face significant milestones domestically over the next few months. For President Trump, further market disruptions arising out of tensions with China could impact his administration’s agenda over his last two years in office through potential electoral losses in the mid-term elections to be held this November. The administration also has an ongoing war with Iran that already generating significant headwinds domestically. Adding additional economic challenges arising out of reciprocal tariff escalation is a risk the White House seems not to want to take.
For President Xi, the once-every-five-years Communist Party National Congress—scheduled for October 2027—looms over any agreements rendered with the United States. Given their potential impact on President Xi’s standing within the party, it is not surprising that he would seek mostly to keep things calm. This week also served an important purpose for Xi by providing him with the pomp and circumstance that came with his state visit along with stability that mitigates the likelihood of unforeseen economic disruptions in advance of the Congress. Those will be invaluable indicators to the rest of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Standing Committee of the value of keeping President Xi in place for a fourth term.
