How the Indo-Pacific is Coping with a Less Reliable United States

U.S. President Donald Trump’s vacillating foreign policy and his willingness to gamble big to try to resolve entrenched global challenges are creating concern among America’s Indo-Pacific allies and partners that they may need to fundamentally rethink their own defense and security strategies, which have for decades relied on consistent U.S. leadership in the region. For the moment, several Indo-Pacific allies and partners—namely Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and India—continue to build strong security and defense ties with the United States. For its part, the second Trump administration recently published both a National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy that represent more continuity than change when it comes to policies in the Indo-Pacific and indicate continued prioritization of this vital region. 

However, if the United States becomes further embroiled in other parts of the world and loses focus on the Indo-Pacific, regional countries will likely start hedging against the increased possibility of the People’s Republic of China becoming the regional hegemon. Without a steady U.S. presence and guidance in the region, these countries would likely adopt a more accommodationist approach toward China, contributing to a shift in the overall regional balance of power in Beijing’s favor.

Fortunately, the situation has not yet shifted in this direction, and there is still time to provide reassurance to allies and partners that the United States remains committed to maintaining free and open seaways and ensuring no one country dominates the region or threatens the sovereignty of other nations.

Mixed Signals on Indo-Pacific Commitment

The National Security Strategy, which was published in January 2025, commits the United States to deterring conflict over Taiwan and anywhere in the First Island Chain, while the National Defense Strategy (NDS), released one month later, talks about a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific in which no one country dominates and where a “decent peace” can be enjoyed by all. The NDS also emphasizes the importance of peace and security in the First Island Chain and notes Japan’s important role in burden sharing when it comes to maintaining peace there.

Several actions of the second Trump administration also demonstrate a commitment to strengthening U.S. alliance relationships, particularly with Japan. President Trump made a point to meet Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi one week after her election last fall and met her again on March 19 at the White House, where they discussed ways to expand strategic defense cooperation, supply chain resilience, and energy security and committed to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Demonstrating unity with regard to Taiwan was important since President Trump had initially failed to support Prime Minister Takaichi last fall when she came under fire from China for indicating Japan could respond militarily to a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan.

U.S. force planning and military training in Japan also remain on track. The second Trump administration is pushing ahead with efforts to convert U.S. Forces Japan into a joint force headquarters to coordinate day-to-day operational activities with the Japanese Self-Defense Force’s Joint Operations Command. In late February, Japan and the United States launched a major military exercise, “Iron Fist,” in which 5,000 U.S. and Japanese forces participated in exercises aimed at improving island chain defense and preparing for complex contingencies.

President Trump has also kept the U.S. alliance with Australia largely on track. After the current administration initially showed skepticism toward the AUKUS initiative—launched during the Biden administration—President Trump threw his weight behind it in October 2025, saying the United States was “moving full steam ahead with AUKUS.”

Likewise, the U.S. relationship with the Philippines continues to make progress under Trump. President Trump met with Philippines President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. last July, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the formation of a US-Philippines Task Force to “establish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific” last November. The two countries are scheduled to hold 500 military-to-military engagements throughout 2026, and Washington is increasing military aid with plans to provide $2.5 billion in foreign military financing to Manila from 2026 to 2030.

Also notable is the Trump administration’s focus on enhancing coordination among the militaries of Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. In November 2025, the defense ministers from the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines formally endorsed the establishment of an Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Cooperation Council to improve minister-level coordination.

Another sign that the Trump administration appreciates the significance of minilateral cooperation in building a web of networked security partnerships was Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s meeting with his Japanese and Philippines counterparts for a trilateral meeting on the fringes of the ASEAN meetings last July. The three nations agreed to coordinate on maritime security, trilateral military exercises, and capacity building of the Philippine Coast Guard. The meeting further demonstrates the importance of the First Island Chain when it comes to Trump’s defense priorities in the region.       

While signals toward these three core Indo-Pacific allies have been encouraging, the second Trump administration’s approach toward strategic partner India has been short-sighted. U.S.-India relations plummeted in the second half of 2025 following Trump’s imposition of 50 percent tariffs—one of the highest rates in the world—on Indian exports in August 2025. The situation has improved since early February, however, after the two sides announced a framework for an interim trade deal that included cutting tariffs on Indian goods to eighteen percent. But it will not be easy to restore overall Indian trust in the Trump administration, especially since Trump has made overtures to India’s archrival, Pakistan, and continues to tout his personal role in achieving a ceasefire between India and Pakistan, even though India denies there was any outside intervention.

Last year’s deterioration in U.S.-India ties precluded the holding of a Quad (United States, India, Japan, and Australia) summit, the first year without one since 2020. This gave a sense of slowing momentum, even as the Quad foreign ministers met twice and operational activities like the first-ever Quad-at-Sea Observer Mission were held in 2025.

Contingency Planning for US Retrenchment

Despite a relatively steady approach to the Indo-Pacific so far, the region must be prepared for potential significant changes in U.S. policy as has been observed from Trump in other parts of the world. President Trump’s regime change operation in Venezuela and the ongoing U.S.-Israeli war in Iran demonstrate this administration will pursue bold military actions involving significant political risks without necessarily having a plan in place to deal with the fallout of its actions. Trump’s approach to global affairs is raising alarm among Asian allies and partners that the United States can no longer be counted on to lead a rules-based order that protects sovereignty of nations and shields vulnerable nations from economic and military coercion. India, for example, was taken aback when a U.S. submarine attacked an Iranian vessel in the Indian Ocean that had just participated in a multilateral naval exercise off the coast of India.

The vision for the Quad, which was revived during Trump’s first term, was for it to serve as a bulwark against rising Chinese economic, political, and military influence in the region. The Quad was to assert a rules-based order for the Indo-Pacific that would protect freedom of seaways, peace, and prosperity. Yet, now, it is the United States that is testing that ruled-based order and causing disruption and a sense of chaos in the region.

As Zack Cooper argues in an article in the March/April 2026 edition of Foreign Affairs, several Indo-Pacific nations are already rethinking their alignment decisions and concluding that Beijing will be the inevitable regional hegemon. If the United States stays bogged down in Iran, there will be fewer U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military resources to strengthen the overall U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the United States could slow its tempo of holding multilateral naval exercises and reduce the frequency of its freedom of navigation operations, including through the Taiwan Strait. In this scenario, nations like Japan would be forced to shoulder the burden of maintaining international norms in the region and would likely focus on strengthening bilateral ties with other Indo-Pacific countries with hopes that U.S. attention would eventually return to the region.

The Costs of Bucking Strategy  

Trump’s transactional approach and unpredictability when it comes to foreign policy is a challenge for all nations that seek good relations with the United States and want to partner with Washington to prevent Beijing’s domination of the region. Japan’s Prime Minister Takaichi has demonstrated unusual forbearance and skill in adjusting and adapting to the Trump administration’s ever-shifting priorities and demands. 

However, the United States cannot expect its allies to line up behind it indefinitely when U.S. officials have failed to consult them ahead of time about their plans and strategies for pursuing risky military gambits. By similar token, Washington must not be surprised if allies begin to rethink their strategies in the Indo-Pacific in the growing absence of U.S. presence and leadership there.

While the United States is undoubtedly still the most powerful nation in the world, it is ill-prepared to deal with the challenges of a rising China alone. That is why the United States has been pursuing initiatives like AUKUS, which enables U.S. allies like Australia to burden share and contribute to Indo-Pacific deterrence.

A year ago, the hope was that the second Trump administration would pick up the threads of its Indo-Pacific Strategic Framework, which was signed by President Trump in February 2018, and drove U.S. strategy toward the region until the end of his first term. Now that it is clear the second Trump administration will pursue its own priorities on its own timeline and with little consultation with friends and allies, these nations are likely to consider developing alternative strategies that rely less on U.S. resources and capabilities.

It is not too late for the Trump administration to turn the situation around and rebuild strategic trust with its closest allies and partners. They are looking to the United States for a consistent economic, diplomatic, and military presence and reliable, proactive engagement that advances deterrence, prosperity, and peace. Even a nod in this direction from U.S. officials would help prevent Indo-Pacific allies and partners from hedging strategies that would ultimately strengthen China’s global position.

The views expressed are solely the author’s and do not reflect those of Perry World House, the University of Pennsylvania, or Carnegie Corporation of New York.