The views expressed are solely the author’s and do not reflect those of Perry World House, the University of Pennsylvania, or Carnegie Corporation of New York.
South Korea faces an increasingly uncertain security environment. The way conflicts have erupted in Europe and the Middle East demonstrates that devastating war is more than a remote possibility in Asia. The People’s Republic of China’s growing military assertiveness against Taiwan raises concerns about the possibility of simultaneous conflicts on the peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait that could stretch the defense capabilities of Seoul’s primary security benefactor. On the peninsula, the security situation is far from tranquil. Since 2005, North Korea has conducted over 200 ballistic missile tests and six nuclear tests.[1] It enshrined nuclear weapons status permanently into the constitution over a decade ago and stipulated its right to preemptive use of nuclear weapons in September 2022. It is seeking the second leg of the nuclear triad in a sea-based capability and tactical nuclear weapons to use in war. Kim Jong-un’s legacy-seeking ambition is to become a nuclear weapons state on par with France or the United Kingdom by the end of the decade. All diplomatic efforts at negotiating away North Korea’s nuclear weapons have failed, with the last actual dismantlement efforts and international inspections taking place during the Six-Party talks almost two decades ago. International sanctions pressure on North Korea has significantly decreased with Chinese and Russian non-compliance, and the United Nations Security Council, once unanimous in its ten previous resolutions on North Korea, has been stymied from action by Moscow and Beijing.
This dim picture has led to heightened speculation that South Korea will inevitably head down the nuclear path. Scholars and opinion leaders have forcefully argued the logic of why South Korea should pursue nuclearization.[2] Twice before, this critical U.S. ally has tried to develop nuclear weapons clandestinely, starting nearly a half-century ago.[3] Moreover, recent South Korean opinion polling points to most of the public asserting that their country should acquire nuclear weapons—or, at a minimum, call for the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol broke taboo when he stated his belief that South Korea could easily and quickly become a nuclear weapons state given its high levels of science and technology expertise.[4]
Is South Korea the next nuclear weapons state? The stakes of this question are exceedingly high. A nuclear South Korea could severely damage its alliance with the United States, as it would be tantamount to a statement of no-confidence in the U.S. security guarantee. A nuclear South Korea could also set off a “nuclear domino chain” among other states in the region, including Japan and Taiwan. It could create crisis instability on the peninsula, tempting North Korea to act preemptively. It could create insecurity spirals with Russia, China, and Japan, which would see new strategic threats from the peninsula.
Concerns about a nuclear South Korea are so high that they have been a driver of alliance politics. The subtext of the highly successful April 2023 state visit by President Yoon to the White House was a set of agreements designed to manage any nuclear aspirations by South Korea. The creation of the Washington Declaration and the Nuclear Consultative Group in 2023 had two purposes: One was to shore up allied deterrence against the burgeoning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from North Korea, but the other was to assure South Korea of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella such that it did not contemplate its own nuclear path. Washington even sought in writing a commitment from Seoul to remain a non-nuclear state in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as part of the Washington Declaration. These developments reinforce the impression that South Korea is on the verge of a nuclear breakout.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies distributed an opinion poll to over 1,000 strategic elites in South Korea between January 15 and March 17, 2024, on this question. This demographic was selected because the views of strategic elites—defined as academics, think tank experts, business elites, legislators, and officials (current and former)—is understood to better reflect both the state of national discussion and the views influential in decision-making on issues of national security. Key findings run contrary to the public discussion of this issue:
- Two-thirds of South Korea’s strategic elites do not favor nuclearization of South Korea (66 percent opposed or uncertain), while only one-third support it (34 percent).
- The 34 percent of strategic elites who support nuclearization is a significantly lower number than the oft-cited 76 percent support of the general public and is a better indicator of the current attitudes of South Korea toward the nuclear option.
- The main reason South Korea’s strategic elites do not favor nuclearization is the consequences in terms of international condemnation, reputational costs, and sanctions, highlighting the value that elites place on South Korea’s global status in the rules-based international order.
- Strategic elite opposition to a nuclear South Korea, however, is not unconditional. Should abandonment fears regarding the U.S. security commitment come to fruition (such as the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops by a future U.S. administration), 51 percent of those opposed to nuclearization would become supportive of this path.
- Thirteen percent of elites remain uncertain about nuclearization, representing a substantial group whose opinions can be shaped by factors such as alliance assurances, adversary threats, and similar means.
- Strategic elites who support nuclearization favor the acquisition of autonomous nuclear capabilities by a two-to-one margin over a nuclear sharing option; those who do not support nuclearization, if pressed, most prefer nuclear sharing over indigenous capabilities by an almost five-to-one margin.
Based on new and original data, however, this paper concludes that concerns about a nuclear South Korea are exaggerated. A minority of South Korean foreign policy thinkers—only 34 percent—believe that their government should consider the nuclear option, while upwards of 66 percent disagree or remain uncertain about such a proposition. Confidence in the United States as a security provider remains strong. But this policy judgment is far from unconditional and permanent. If security deficits emerge on the peninsula, and U.S. security commitments lose credibility, then South Korean support for going nuclear would increase dramatically. More specifically, if Donald Trump’s “America First” policy denigrates alliances and seeks the retrenchment of U.S. security commitments, then support for a nuclear capability by South Korea among non-nuclear advocates would grow exponentially.
This paper’s conclusions differ from those of the oft-cited opinion polls in South Korea because they are gleaned from the views of strategic elites, not the general public. As scholars have argued, major decisions about a government’s national security reflect the views of elites rather than the public—even in a period of increasing populism and resentment of elites—because elites enjoy control of resources, have access to or are themselves top decisionmakers, often have domain-specific knowledge, and can define narratives on national security.[5]
Much of the speculation in Washington and Seoul about South Korea’s nuclear ambitions has been informed by a handful of recent public opinion polls.[6] This has created an echo chamber effect where many pundits have accepted South Korean nuclear ambitions as a reality.[7] Moreover, of the 55 public polls collected on this question, none have bothered to analyze the views of policy experts and elites. This is the first U.S. study, reaching out to over 1,000 South Korean elites, that highlights how the vast majority of respondents in this group are far more cautious about, and resistant to, South Korea going nuclear.[8]
In addition to the lack of enthusiasm for nuclear weapons among South Korean experts, this study offers several other novel findings. For one, there is approximately two times more support for remaining non-nuclear than going nuclear among policy elites. Two, reputational costs and international condemnation is a more important motivating factor in preserving South Korea’s non-nuclear status than damage to the U.S. alliance. Three, those who are positive on nuclearization mostly prefer doing so through indigenous development of a South Korean capability, rather than other possible options (e.g., returning U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula or a nuclear sharing arrangement). Those who oppose nuclearization, if pressed, tend to prefer nuclear sharing arrangements with the United States over going it alone. Finally, more than half of those opposed to South Korean nuclearization would change their minds if the United States proved to be an unreliable security partner.
Victor Cha is President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
[1] “Database: North Korean Provocations,” Beyond Parallel, CSIS, last updated April 2, 2024, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/database-north-korean-provocations/.
[2] Max Boot, “Should South Korea Go Nuclear? That’s a Decision for Seoul, Not Washington,” Washington Post, April 24, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/24/south-korea-ponders-nuclear-weapons-program/; Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press, “South Korea’s Nuclear Options,” Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/south-koreas-nuclear-options-north-korea-deterrence; and “[Asan Plenum 2023] Opening Ceremony_Welcoming Remarks,” YouTube video, posted by The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, May 3, 2023, 21:16, https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=DLsxL_GQJqo.
[4] “尹 대통령, 외교부·국방부 업무보고 마무리 발언 관련 서면 브리핑” [Written Briefing on President Yoon’s Concluding Remarks on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense Work Report], Office of the President Republic of Korea, January 11, 2023, https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/briefing/GvCftpuP.
[5] Ibid.; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes, and David G. Victor, “The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 2 (2013): 368–86, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43280794; Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Linda L. Fowler, Watchdogs on the Hill: The Decline of Congressional Oversight of US Foreign Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).
[6] Toby Dalton, Karl Friedhoff, and Lami Kim, Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 2022), https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/thinking-nuclear-south-korean-attitudes-nuclear-weapons; and “Korean Perceptions toward the North Korean Nuclear Crisis and the Security Environment,” Chey Institute, January 30, 2023, https://www.chey.org/Eng/Issues/IssuesContentsView.aspx?seq=695.
[7] Doug Bandow, “Washington Might Let South Korea Have the Bomb,” Foreign Policy, January 17, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/17/us-south-korea-nuclear-weapons-denuclearization/; Seong-Chang Cheong, “The Case for South Korea to Go Nuclear,” The Diplomat, October 22, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/the-case-for-south-korea-to-go-nuclear/; Kang Choi, “‘공포의 균형’이 대북 억제의 핵심” [‘Balance of Fear’ Is the Key to Deterrence against North Korea], Chosun Ilbo, June 21, 2022, https://www.chosun.com/opinion/chosun_column/2022/06/21/HR4TRS3IABFMTEIJHZ4JAEF5DU/.
[8] The Korean Association of International Studies (KAIS) conducted an elite survey of South Korean academics on nuclearization and released the results in March 2023. See Tae-hwa Kang, “전문가 55% ‘30년내 북핵 해결 불가능’…자체 핵보유 62% 반대” [55% of Experts Say, ‘It Is Impossible to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue within 30 Years’… 62% Oppose Own Nuclear Weapons], The JoongAng, March 24, 2023, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25149788.
