

> POST-WORKSHOP REPORT

Economic Security and the Future of the Global Order in the Indo-Pacific

Perry World House



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This workshop was made possible in part by support from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Shapiro Global Workshop on Geopolitics Fund.

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➤ INTRODUCTION



As geopolitical competition between the United States and the People's Republic of China intensifies, the Indo-Pacific region, home to diverse economies and massive populations, has become a theater of rivalry between the two economic superpowers. From the July 2022 passage of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act (CHIPS) to a Chinese surveillance balloon traveling across North America in February 2023, US-China tensions have focused international attention on the Indo-Pacific, where the region's other countries must navigate ever-changing gray areas.¹

Can the Indo-Pacific move beyond the US-China binary? Can the United States succeed in competing economically with China without damaging bilateral economic relations with the rest of the region, most of which are dependent on China as their largest trading partner? How might policymakers, industries, and multilateral organizations balance security risks with

economic gains as technological advancement and the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic have blurred policy lines? To examine the Indo-Pacific's opportunities for development and identify solutions to regional challenges, Perry World House gathered experts, scholars, and practitioners to discuss meaningful strategies to further dialogue among regional stakeholders, with the goal of transcending the current competitive binary.² Throughout the 2022/23 academic year, the Future of the Global Order research theme has focused on the future of globalization. This workshop continued to explore these issues within the Indo-Pacific context along three issues:

- 1. Multilateral Economic Organizations and Breaking the US-China Box**
- 2. Trade and Economic Perspectives from Southeast Asia**
- 3. The Fight for the Future of Technological Supremacy**

The first panel on multilateral economic organizations sought to evaluate the roles and abilities of the Indo-Pacific region's many trade organizations and alignments in providing states with paths to break free of the binary and assert their own values and interests.³ As navigating US-China economic competition is

1 The White House. 2022. "FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China." *The White House*, August 9, 2022. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/>. Chotiner, Isaac. 2023. "What's Behind the Chinese Spy Balloon." *The New Yorker*, February 18, 2023. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/whats-behind-the-chinese-spy-balloon>.

2 The workshop was conducted under Chatham House Rules, so none of the material described in this report is attributed to a specific individual or organization.

3 These organizations and alignments include the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).

nothing new to Southeast Asian foreign policy strategy—Southeast Asia historically balanced and hedged its alignments in pursuit of its diverse strategic interests—the second panel on Southeast Asian perspectives examined the range of economies and international commitments across Southeast Asia, as well as possible opportunities for leadership and development. The final panel on technological competition identified emerging and critical technologies as the key theater of US–China strategic competition, particularly in the semiconductor industry, artificial intelligence, green energy, and rare earth materials. Both powers continue to adopt and refine policies meant to diminish rival capacity and development in these key sectors. Policy conversations often focus on how such policies slow and damage either the US or China, but frequently overlook the costs and potential gains of this competition for other key actors in the region.⁴

Perry World House’s Future of Global Order theme examines the future of power, technology, and governance. In fall 2022, Perry World House convened a colloquium titled “A Fracturing World: The Future of Globalization”, which discussed the possibility of global economic bifurcation, paths forward for integration, as well as new opportunities in technology and labor across diverse economies. It analyzed the potential for a more fragmented global economy and the impact that such bifurcation would have on the current global order. They also explored ways to promote greater integration and cooperation across different regions and economic systems.⁵ The 2023 Indo-Pacific workshop continued this conversation by bringing together policymakers, academics, analysts, and thought leaders for interdisciplinary discussions on multilateralism, technological competition, and Southeast Asian perspectives. Aligning with the mission of Perry World House to bridge the gap between policymakers and scholars, the workshop sparked direct conversation, allowing academics to discuss their research with practitioners to help them make informed policy

decisions. This report summarizes both the challenges the Indo-Pacific region faces and potential solutions that emerged during the discussion.

THE INDO-PACIFIC CONTEXT

The Indo-Pacific, from India to Chile, is experiencing both tremendous economic growth and growing US–China competition. Economies within the region range from the world’s most developed and advanced, including the United States, Canada, and Japan, to some of its poorest, such as Nepal, Cambodia, and Myanmar, as well as growing economic behemoths India and China. In a 2021 address on the US commitment to security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken described the Indo-Pacific as the world’s fastest-growing region, home to over half of the global population, 60 percent of the global economy, and two-thirds of all economic growth over the past five years.⁶ Global Affairs Canada similarly highlights the region’s centrality: with “over four billion people and \$47.19 trillion in economic activity, it is the world’s fastest growing-region and home to six of Canada’s top thirteen trading partners.”⁷

The region’s size and economic import is matched by its security salience. Naming strategic competition with China as “the primary concern for US national security,” the Department of Defense described the Indo-Pacific in 2019 as its priority theater and the most important region for American strategy.⁸ This view of the region’s importance is shared by Japan, Australia, India, and Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) member states. However, Chinese foreign policy views Indo-Pacific initiatives as US competition for influence in the region.⁹ While the United States is a key military and political partner for a number of Indo-Pacific states, China remains the largest trading partner for nearly every state in Asia.

Caught between two great powers, other states in the Indo-Pacific have developed strategies of hedging and

4 The Economist. “America’s Asian Allies Dislike Its Tech War on China.” *The Economist*, December 1, 2022. <https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/12/01/americas-asian-allies-dislike-its-tech-war-on-china>.

5 Udani, Catalina M., Thomas J. Shattuck, Jared Rosen, and Sabrina Egal. “A Fracturing World: The Future of Globalization,” *Perry World House*, September 2022. <https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/penn-global/pwh-go-colloquium-2022-report.pdf>.

6 US Department of State. “Secretary Blinken’s Remarks on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” *Department of State*, December 13, 2021. <https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/>.

7 Canada Global Affairs. “Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.” *Government of Canada Global Affairs*, January 10, 2023. <https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/>.

8 US Department of Defense. “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region.” *Department of Defense*, June 1, 2019. <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>.

9 Heiduk, Felix, and Gudrun Wacker. “From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance, Implementation and Challenges.” *Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik*, Research Paper, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.18449/2020RP09>.
Medcalf, Rory. *Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2020.
Pardesi, Manjeet S. “The Indo-Pacific: A ‘New’ Region or the Return of History?” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 74(2): 124–46, March 3, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1693496>.



Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Fellow for International Political Economy at the Council on Foreign Relations, speaks on the panel discussing multilateral economic organizations and breaking the US–China box.

shifting alignments over time.¹⁰ In a keynote address at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong welcomed proposals for inclusive Indo-Pacific regional integration, but only if they did not “create rival blocs, deepen fault lines, or force countries to take sides,” while other Southeast Asian leaders, such as Indonesian President Joko Widodo, promote Chinese collaboration with ASEAN and other members of the Indo-Pacific.¹¹ While the majority of the Indo-Pacific generally pursues regional stability and openness, recent steps made by both the United States and China threaten this balancing act. Continued assertive territorial claims and military expansions by China in the South China Sea antagonize competing claimants Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.¹² US efforts to compete technologically with China and recent rhetorical movements in favor of the defense of Taiwan may intensify global fracturing following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with the focus of security concerns revolving around a potential military clash over Taiwan.¹³ As US–China tensions increase, so, too, may pressure for state governments to take sides, potentially stirring tensions within Indo-Pacific civil societies torn between two political, cultural, and economic paradigms.

Though states throughout the region risk triangulation between the United States and China regarding their economic prosperity and national security, there also exist opportunities for states to gain greater agency and leadership through developing an Indo-Pacific regional economic framework beyond the US–China binary. Participants examined the challenges of the US–China competitive framework and identified possible paths forward, which may transform the Indo-Pacific region with tremendous significance for the global order.



Perry World House Senior Executive Director LaShawn R. Jefferson begins the day with introductory remarks.

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- 10 Goh, Evelyn. “Southeast Asian Strategies toward the Great Powers: Still Hedging after All These Years?” *The Asan Forum*, February 22, 2016. <https://theasanforum.org/southeast-asian-strategies-toward-the-great-powers-still-hedging-after-all-these-years/>
- Shambaugh, David. “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?” *International Security*, 42(4): 85–127, May 1, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00314.
- 11 Stromseth, Jonathan. “Don’t Make Us Choose: Southeast Asia in the Throes of US–China Rivalry.” *Brookings*, October 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/dont-make-us-choose-southeast-asia-in-the-throes-of-US-China-rivalry/>
- 12 Center for Preventative Action. “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, May 4, 2022. <https://cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea>.
- 13 The Economist. “How the Rivalry between America and China Worries South-East Asia.” *The Economist*, November 17, 2022. <https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/11/17/how-the-rivalry-between-america-and-china-worries-south-east-asia>.

> POLICY CHALLENGES



The workshop discussion identified a number of key policy challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region, all linked to the realization that the status quo can no longer suffice and that economic security and national security are inextricably linked in the post-COVID geopolitical environment.

INEXTRICABLE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION

A key theme of the workshop's discussion was an increasing awareness that the longstanding policy distinctions between the security and economic spheres no longer hold. Policymakers are increasingly mindful of the crucial connections between economic security and national security. The widespread supply-chain disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic uncovered structural problems in the globalized economy, from dependence on overseas production for critical healthcare supplies to a lack of supply-chain resilience and redundancy, demonstrating the profound implications of the global economic order for states'

national security.¹⁴ Policymakers in states across the Indo-Pacific region, from Canada to India, provided aid to improve domestic production of critical supplies in 2020, emphasizing the national security risks posed by international supply-chain vulnerabilities.¹⁵

Participants pointed to pandemic-induced shifts in foreign policy toward China across the Indo-Pacific region—led by US efforts to increase domestic and regional investment in production—as evidence of overlap in economic and national security. Other Indo-Pacific powers, such as Japan, similarly responded to supply-chain disruptions by instituting a multibillion-dollar emergency package to shift production of critical goods from China to Japan or ASEAN member states.¹⁶ Japan's ongoing economic security initiative was supplemented by its new National Security Strategy, announced in 2022, which changed Japan's long-held post-World War II pacifism to call for new counterstrike capabilities in the face of potential Chinese security threats.¹⁷ Central to economic security for all parties is Taiwan, as it produces more than 92 percent of the world's most advanced semiconductors.¹⁸ Considering recent global supply-chain disruptions and international dependence on economies like Taiwan, many states are reconfiguring their economic policies as part of their security strategy.

A key point that emerged during discussions was that despite the Biden administration's attempts to improve

14 Iakovou, Eleftherios, and Chelsea C. White III. "How to Build More Secure, Resilient, next-Gen U.S. Supply Chains." *Brookings*, December 3, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-to-build-more-secure-resilient-next-gen-u-s-supply-chains/>.

15 Evenett, Simon J. "Chinese Whispers: COVID-19, Global Supply Chains in Essential Goods, and Public Policy." *Journal of International Business Policy*, 3(4): 408–29, December 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-020-00075-5>.

16 Arase, David. "The Coronavirus Has Complicated China-Japan Relations. How Will This Benefit ASEAN?" *South China Morning Post*, August 12, 2020. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3096911/coronavirus-has-complicated-china-japan-relations-how-will>.

17 Adler, David E. "Why 'Economic Security' Became Magic Words in Japan." *Foreign Policy*, January 20, 2023. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/20/japan-china-economic-security-strategic-threat/>.

18 Lee, Yimou, Norihiko Shirouzu, and David Lague. "Taiwan Chip Industry Emerges as Battlefield in U.S.-China Showdown." *Reuters*, December 27, 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/taiwan-china-chips/>.

the US economic presence in the Indo-Pacific with the administration's first major trade initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), China has a significant head start. IPEF, introduced in May 2022 with prospective member states—including Australia, Japan, and India—has yet to bear fruit.¹⁹ Chinese-led efforts to secure closer economic linkages across the Pacific, on the other hand, have already generated immense integration throughout Asia and in Latin America. China is Latin America's second-largest trading partner after the United States and is its biggest sovereign lender, overtaking the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.²⁰ Participants noted that the Trump administration's 2017 withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) may have left policymakers in Asia skeptical of US implementation.²¹ These questions on the efficacy of multilateral and regional trade organizations are particularly salient in light of growing regionalization following the supply-chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, leading states to intertwine their national security and domestic economic security policies more closely.²²

Participants also noted that initiatives fostering closer economic cooperation within the region may also reinforce a competitive binary: US Indo-Pacific strategy emphasizes competition with China, leaving other states in the region caught in the competitive security and economic crosshairs.²³ China identified the IPEF initiative as an attempt at economic decoupling, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi describing US Indo-Pacific strategy as distinctly confrontational.²⁴ On

the security front, though both the United States and China have reiterated their opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict in Ukraine, increasingly intertwined security and economic competition is apparent as the United States moves forward with increasing commitments with Taiwan through the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, despite strong security signaling from China.²⁵ Military confrontation between the United States and China, such as over Taiwan, would mete out costs to both competitors and their would-be regional allies caught in the middle.²⁶

Participants were quite decisive in their opinion as to which country has more economic influence in the Indo-Pacific. In a prior survey of all workshop participants,²⁷ 58 percent said that China was more influential than the United States, with only 17 percent saying the United States.

US-CHINA TECHNOLOGY WAR

The challenge of superpower technological competition undergirded every discussion: the rapid pace of technological change has made it a key determinant of success in global conflicts, with cyberspace being the new battleground for the most advanced weapons. Competition in technological advancement is what Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Bill Burns has identified as the “main area for competition and rivalry with China.”²⁸ This is particularly evident in tensions over Taiwan's significance to global technology.²⁹ Potential escalation of this technological

19 Manak, Inu. “Unpacking the IPEF: Biden's First Big Trade Play.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 8, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/article/unpacking-ipef-bidens-first-big-trade-play>.

20 Guzmán, Julio Armando. “China's Latin American Power Play.” *Foreign Affairs*, January 20, 2023. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/central-america-caribbean/chinas-latin-american-power-play>.

21 Solis, Mireya. “Trump Withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.” *Brookings*, March 24, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/03/24/trump-withdrawing-from-the-trans-pacific-partnership/>.

22 Beal, Theo. “Economic Security: A Need for a Renewed Global Effort.” *Chatham House International Affairs Think Tank*, March 21, 2022. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/economic-security-need-renewed-global-effort/>; and O'Neil, Shannon K. *The Globalization Myth: Regionalization and How America's Neighbors Help It Compete*. Council on Foreign Relations Books. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022.

23 Medcalf, 2020. Pardesi, 2020.

The Economist. “What Pacific Island States Make of the Great-Power Contest over Them.” *The Economist*, October 6, 2022. <http://www.economist.com/asia/2022/10/06/what-pacific-island-states-make-of-the-great-power-contest-over-them>.

24 Ng, Teddy. “China Says Washington's ‘Divisive’ Indo-Pacific Strategy Doomed to Fail.” *South China Morning Post*, May 23, 2022. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3178764/china-says-washingtons-divisive-indo-pacific-strategy-doomed>.

25 Tran, Hung. “US-China Competition after the US Midterms and the CCP 20th Congress.” *Atlantic Council*, November 23, 2022. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/US-China-competition-after-the-us-midterms-and-the-ccp-20th-congress/>.

Dooley, Ben. “With 5 Missiles, China Sends Stark Signal to Japan and U.S. on Taiwan.” *The New York Times*, August 4, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/04/world/asia/china-japan-taiwan-missiles.html>.

26 Kuo, Raymond. “‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Has the U.S. and Taiwan Trapped.” *Foreign Policy*, January 18, 2023. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/18/taiwan-US-China-strategic-ambiguity-military-strategy-asymmetric-defense-invasion/>.

Wong, Edward. “Biden and Kishida Vow to Bolster US-Japan Alliance as China's Power Grows.” *The New York Times*, January 13, 2023. <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/13/us/politics/biden-kishida-japan.html>.

27 In order to identify expert perceptions of the many changes visible in the current global order, Perry World House asked participants to fill out a short survey on key issues related to the theme of the workshop. The figures in the appendix of this report are thus based on participants' responses. Not all participants answered all questions, and these charts should not be interpreted to represent any individual panelist's view.

28 NPR. “Transcript: NPR's Full Conversation With CIA Director William Burns.” *NPR*, July 22, 2021. <https://www.npr.org/2021/07/22/1017900583/transcript-npr-full-conversation-with-cia-director-william-burns>.

29 Miller, Chris. *Chip War: The Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology*. New York: Scribner, 2022. Lee, Shirouzu, and Lague, 2021.



Roselyn Hsueh (center), Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University, and Neena Shenai (right), Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, discussed the ways that multilateral economic organizations could break the US-China Box.

rivalry may disrupt supply chains and create barriers to trade and investment in the region.³⁰

Along the theme of a shattered economic-security binary, participants discussed the policy battles in the unfolding technology war, from US-imposed restrictions on technology exports to China and legal action against some Chinese tech firms, such as Huawei, alleging national security concerns with Chinese imports,³¹ to growing decoupling from Chinese technology as an increasingly common US policy agenda.³² Similarly, China restricts the access of foreign companies to Chinese consumers, protecting its domestic technology sector.³³ However, participants noted that China is still far from self-reliant on advanced technology, as are other states in the Indo-Pacific. Other Indo-Pacific countries are still particularly dependent on US or Chinese control over critical technologies or supply chains, and any multilateral governance in new technology spheres hinges on the political clout of the two.

TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY

Participants identified a number of important clashes in US–China technological competition that blur the lines between rivalry in economic production and rivalry in the security sphere. The involvement of Silicon Valley in

China’s domestic surveillance efforts presents troubling contradictions to the liberal order: US companies are complicit in state monitoring of Chinese citizens.³⁴ The recent spy balloon incident has increased US wariness toward China, and China’s indifferent response further strained relations.³⁵ The United States also continues to strongly warn China against providing “lethal aid” to Russia or helping Russia evade sanctions for the invasion of Ukraine, but recent diplomatic talks between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin further stir concern.³⁶

A major puzzle identified during the workshop was how other states in the region navigate their existing alignments to avoid losses from trade and to retain security—the majority of states in Southeast Asia rely heavily on both superpowers, and while states in the Indo-Pacific all share the goal of further digital development, their existing positions and trade partnerships in emerging technologies depend heavily on each state’s current level of economic growth. In examining which partners in the Indo-Pacific the United States should prioritize, participants readily identified Taiwan as the most important and most vulnerable US partner, considering its chip foundries and China’s interests. Participants also identified both Japan and the Philippines as crucial US allies in cross-strait relations as hosts of US forces and assets. In the worst-case scenario of Chinese military action toward

30 Hass, Ryan, Patricia M. Kim, Emilie Kimball, et al. “U.S.-China Technology Competition: A Brookings Global China Interview.” *Brookings*, December 23, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/essay/u-s-china-technology-competition/>.

31 Ibid.

NPR, “U.S. Bans the Sale and Import of Some Tech from Chinese Companies Huawei and ZTE.” *NPR*, November 26, 2022. <https://www.npr.org/2022/11/26/1139258274/us-ban-tech-china-huawei-zte>.

32 Bateman, Jon. *U.S.-China Technological “Decoupling”: A Strategy and Policy Framework*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Bateman_US-China_Decoupling_final.pdf

33 Blumenthal, Dan, Gregory Graff, and Christian Curriden. “How China Views It: Sino-American Technology Competition.” American Enterprise Institute, October 20, 2022. <https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/how-china-views-it-sino-american-technology-competition/>.

34 Chin, Josh, and Liza Lin. *Surveillance State: Inside China’s Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2022.

35 Chotiner, 2023.

36 The Washington Post. “Ukraine Live Briefing: Blinken Warns China against Giving ‘Lethal Support’ to Russia, as Leaders Meet in Munich,” *The Washington Post*, February 19, 2023. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/19/russia-ukraine-war-latest-updates/>.

Taiwan to secure physical control over technology production, the conflict would bring the global economy to a halt.

Participants advised that America's treaty allies in the region can leverage their alignment to enjoy more freedom to maneuver as US–China technological competition continues. US-allied states can make bids for US technological investment to secure vulnerable supply chains, and their well-established channels of communication with the US provide them greater agility and leverage to do so.

REBUILDING RELATIONS VS. DECOUPLING

The prevailing question among participants was whether it is still possible for the United States and China to reconstruct their economic relationship despite growing security tensions and the vanishing distinction between security and economic spheres. The supply-chain disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the lack of redundancy in the existing global economic order, but is reshoring or “friendshoring” a viable solution in the near term? Considering accelerating changes in global geopolitical tensions, particularly with China and Russia, participants anticipate major structural changes in the global economic and political order. While participants agreed that a return to more stable and friendly US–China relations is deeply unlikely, they examined the dangers of decoupling, the implications of further global fracturing for the rest of the Indo-Pacific, and the limits of US industrial capacity.

Participants identified numerous long-term risks to total US decoupling from China, including the threat decoupling poses to the international economic system. The United States played a significant role in the economic liberalization of the post–World War II global order, and it continues to maintain economic interdependence, particularly in the Global North, intended to result in shared responsibility and stabilization of the international system through cross-border economic regimes.³⁷ Decoupling from China may risk the United States designing itself out of the international order, incurring adverse effects for US trade and the entire system. Participants urged further consideration of the negative consequences of friendshoring policy initiatives and reducing dependencies on unfriendly nations, particularly in maintaining US technological leverage over China.

As long as China remains dependent on US technology, participants suggested that cooperation may still be possible.

The American business community, traditionally a bulwark of US–China trade, remains fractured regarding the extent of US decoupling from China. A core cadre in favor of rebuilding the US–China relationship and the democratizing effects of market liberalization still exists. Participant opinion was mixed on the specific degree of decoupling, reshoring, or friendshoring, but they largely agreed that US trade policy, and IPEF in particular, should be reframed, as its current containment lens appears to only continue to escalate tensions.³⁸

While China continues to decouple on its own terms and races to narrow America's technological advantage, participants examined the feasibility of US decoupling and reshoring in its industrial capacity, particularly in semiconductor production. Participants emphasized the importance of the manufacturing process in maintaining US technological supremacy and that effective industrial policy is necessary to this effort. Some participants noted that the United States has historically had a limited ability to effectuate industrial policy outside of defense manufacturing.

Participants were evenly split on whether or not the United States would economically decouple from China, with 35 percent saying it was “likely,” another 35 percent saying it was “not likely,” and 23 percent taking a “neutral” position. However, when the question gets expanded beyond the United States to include its allies and partners, the participants had a much more similar view of likelihood.

When asked specifically about US allies and partners and prospects for decoupling, participants were skeptical, with 52 percent saying it was “not likely.” The results to this question are quite similar to a related question posed to participants from the September 2022 Global Order Colloquium. In that survey question, “How likely is it that the United States and its allies/partners will economically decouple from China?” 55 percent of participants said that it was “not likely,” with 23 percent taking a “neutral” stance and 18 percent saying it was a “likely” outcome.³⁹

37 Ruggie, John Gerard. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” *International Organization*, 36(2), 1982. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706527>.

38 Manak, Inu. “Unpacking the IPEF: Biden's First Big Trade Play.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 8, 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/article/unpacking-ipef-bidens-first-big-trade-play>.

39 Udani, et al., 2022, p. 13.



The workshop covered a breadth of issues concerning the Indo-Pacific region like technological supremacy, trade, and economic policies.

“DON’T MAKE US CHOOSE”: CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

Consequences for other states in the Indo-Pacific were an omnipresent theme of the workshop. Spillover of the US–China rivalry curtails the development of emerging technologies and negatively impacts other states that rely on technology imports from both competitors.⁴⁰ Indo-Pacific countries largely exhibit the prevailing sentiment of “don’t make us choose.” Many states in the Indo-Pacific have strong extant ties to the United States, such as longstanding security treaty allies Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, and participants noted that these states play key roles in US security strategy.⁴¹ Yet, China leads in economic and diplomatic efforts in the region, particularly in its Belt and Road Initiative of expansive infrastructure projects connecting Asia to Europe.⁴² US foreign policy has been directed toward Southeast Asia in recent administrations, with the Biden administration launching initiatives such as the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022. However, America’s explicit focus on containing China forces potential Southeast Asian partners into a binary, and the values-based democracy promotion deployed in US initiatives in the region alienates its many nondemocratic states.⁴³

This ideological framing of the US–China rivalry—democracy versus autocracy—oversimplifies the complex reality of different shades of autocracy, participants explained, and leaves little room for cooperation between different types of states. Among the diverse states of Southeast Asia, there is significant reluctance to choose sides, and increasing overlap between strategic and economic competition exacerbates this paralysis. Participants identified various consequences for Indo-Pacific states along a spectrum of integration with the global economy. For small countries heavily reliant on trade and foreign investment, such as Singapore, a trade war could have enormous economic consequences. On the other hand, countries like Indonesia, with a large market and natural resources, are less vulnerable to the impacts of a US–China trade war but have also not fully tapped into the benefits of economic integration.

In examining policymaker sentiment across the Indo-Pacific regarding US–China competition, participants discussed the results of the 2022 State of Southeast Asia survey, conducted by the ASEAN

40 Mak, Robyn. “Breakingviews - Review: U.S.-China Tech Fight Leaves Global Losers.” *Reuters*, September 30, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/review-US-China-tech-fight-leaves-global-losers-2022-09-30/>.

41 The White House. “FACT SHEET: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States.” *The White House* (blog), February 11, 2022. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/11/fact-sheet-indo-pacific-strategy-of-the-united-states/>.

42 Shambaugh, 2018.

43 Grossman, Derek. “Biden’s Half-Hearted Southeast Asia Policy.” *Foreign Policy*, January 10, 2023. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/10/southeast-asia-asean-china-biden-us-policy/>.

Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, noting crucial differences in elite perception of both powers: according to the survey, 60 percent of Southeast Asian elites see China as the region's most influential economic actor, compared to just 10 percent naming the United States, but 65 percent of these elites also fear China's growing influence, while 66 percent welcome US economic influence.⁴⁴ Southeast Asian states fear the global economic bifurcation that may emerge from total US decoupling from China; policymakers value market access, which may be jeopardized by the inflexibility of decoupling. Despite openness among policymakers in Southeast Asia to further US cooperation, the 2017 US withdrawal from the TPP threatens confidence in US investment, and the Indo-Pacific status quo is dependent on China's economic cooperation.

Participants concluded that dependence on trade with both the United States and China across the Indo-Pacific and particularly in Southeast Asia makes the sentiment “don't make us choose” unsurprising but complicated nonetheless. The successor to the TPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,⁴⁵ and other agreements, such as the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, will move forward with or without the United States. However, particularly within the diverse economies of Southeast Asia, there is no consensus on how to navigate the competing interests of the two superpowers. Each state has its own unique social, political, and economic conditions that make it more or less comfortable with choices regarding China. Participants reiterated the increasing difficulty of separating economic and strategic considerations, as territorial disputes with China, such as those troubling Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea, are filtering into economic issues.⁴⁶ Some states, such as Thailand, have strong oligarchies with deep ties to China, making them very comfortable economically, while others like Indonesia are being pushed toward closer engagement with China by key domestic actors. The lack of consensus on how other Indo-Pacific states should engage with China highlights the need for continued regional dialogue and cooperation to navigate the evolving dynamics of the US–China rivalry.



Panelists Juita Mohamad (above), Director of the Economics and Business Unit of IDEAS Malaysia and Koichi Ai (below), Minister and Head of Chancery of the Embassy of Japan shared their insight and expertise on the workshop panels, discussing the practices of multilateral economic organizations and economic perspectives from Southeast Asia.

Participants had interesting thoughts on the effect of the US–China technology war on perceptions of each country. Over 35 percent said that the tech war has had a “somewhat negative” effect on views of the United States, with 41 percent taking a “neutral” stance and 11 percent each saying, “very negative” and “somewhat positive.” The views on China had similar results: 47 percent said that the tech war has created a “somewhat negative” view of China, with 52 percent taking a “neutral” stance.

44 Seah, Sharon, Joanne Lin, Sithanoxay Suvannaphakdy, et al. “The State of Southeast Asia 2022: Survey Report.” Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022, p. 4. <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/the-state-of-southeast-asia-2022-survey-report/>.

45 Government of Canada “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).” Government of Canada, 2023. <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpp/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

46 Center for Preventative Action, 2022.

> POLICY SOLUTIONS

In light of the geopolitical and economic challenges identified throughout the workshop, participants foresaw fragmentation and stagnation, but noted that opportunities for transformation still remain. Four avenues for transformation and progress outside the US–China binary emerged during panel discussions:

1. Cooperation through multilateral economic organizations;
2. Regional development in Southeast Asian states and institutions;
3. Emergence of India as an Indo-Pacific power; and
4. Common goals in shared systemic challenges.

COOPERATION THROUGH MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

Policymakers and practitioners must use existing channels of cooperation to prevent increasing US–China economic tension and to stop any possible military conflict in its tracks. While several multilateral economic organizations operate within the region, from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to the ASEAN Economic Community, there is no all-encompassing Indo-Pacific regional grouping.⁴⁷ Though the goals and inclusion criteria of these trade organizations and agreements vary, they share an interest in promoting member state economic integration, increasing trade and investment flows, and improving regional economic cooperation. Participants noted that these organizations are not without conflict, criticism, or challenges to their effectiveness. The World Trade Organization (WTO), preeminent among international economic organizations across regions, commonly faces criticism for inefficacy in a number of issues, such as overcapacity in the fishing industry, or institutional failings that resulted in the 2019 freezing of the WTO appellate body, rendering the organization unable to settle disputes.⁴⁸ Specific to the Indo-Pacific, RCEP faced criticism for exclusion of certain states in the region and for its potential negative impact on small- and medium-sized enterprises.⁴⁹

Despite these failings, multilateral economic organizations provide opportunities for other states in the Indo-Pacific to not only leverage positive economic

47 Felix and Wacker, 2020.

48 Monge, Ernesto Fernández, and Megan Junwiwattanaporn. “Global Deal Will Help Reduce Overfishing and Improve Ocean Health.” *Pew Charitable Trusts*, September 20, 2022. <https://pew.org/3UoIOPu>.
The Economist. “It’s the End of the World Trade Organisation as We Know It.” *The Economist*, November 23, 2019. <http://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/11/23/its-the-end-of-the-world-trade-organisation-as-we-know-it>.

49 Petri, Peter A., and Michael Plummer. “RCEP: A New Trade Agreement That Will Shape Global Economics and Politics.” *Brookings*, November 16, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-agreement-that-will-shape-global-economics-and-politics/>.
Wong, Kandy, and Ralph Jennings. “‘Big Bang Effects’ of World’s Largest Trade Deal yet to Be Seen as RCEP Turns 1.” *South China Morning Post*, January 11, 2023. <https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3206311/worlds-biggest-trade-deal-rcep-year-old-heres-why-it-still-has-room-grow>.

outcomes out of the US–China binary, but also to shape how bilateral competition between the two powers plays out across the region.⁵⁰ While these opportunities come alongside risks of uncertainty, instability, and polarization within the region as states may be forced to choose between the two players,⁵¹ Indo-Pacific states will benefit from strengthening regional institutions and networks of cooperation on issues such as economic development, emerging technologies, security, and environmental cooperation.

A great power rivalry framing of the US–China relationship is counterproductive. Instead, we should focus on the dynamism and benefits of multilateralism. For multilateralism to be effective, however, participants noted that the Indo-Pacific needs strong leadership from key players like the United States and Japan, who can move the agenda forward through institutions like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Inclusive rulemaking is also critical, as actors must feel invested in the process if they are going to follow the rules. While the OECD has traditionally sought like-mindedness in its membership, participants recommended that its Southeast Asian Regional Programme is a strong first step in openness toward more Indo-Pacific states. The OECD should not only disseminate norms and standards but also actively engage with non-members to ensure their effective cooperation with international organizations. Through prioritizing inclusivity and effective rulemaking, multilateralism may serve as one of the strongest solutions to the challenges of the Indo-Pacific landscape.

Participants still stressed the challenge that a more authoritarian China poses, as it has become less open to global markets and that multilateral democracy is necessary in response. American leadership in multilateral organizations and institutionalized cooperation with democratic allies to reconfigure supply chains will improve both markets and democracy throughout the Indo-Pacific, but the United States must also ensure inclusiveness, particularly for Southeast Asian states caught in the middle. Reconfiguring supply chains requires US investment in its allies' development, and existing multilateral initiatives useful for this purpose include the IPEF and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework. APEC is a strong possible avenue to maintain US engagement with China and prevent further escalation of tensions; as APEC is

nonbinding, its multilateral collaboration on food security and the digital economy may provide a good test case for US–China collaboration.

Overall, participants expressed a positive tone toward the success and usefulness of the existing multilateral structure in the Indo-Pacific: 64 percent of participants said that these organizations were “somewhat successful” in fostering substantively meaningful economic relationships, with 17 percent taking a “neutral” stance and another 11 percent saying that the structure has been “very successful.”

“Through prioritizing inclusivity and effective rulemaking, multilateralism may serve as one of the strongest solutions to the challenges of the Indo-Pacific landscape.”

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES AND INSTITUTIONS

Southeast Asian states should pursue proactive and independent foreign policies to forward their own interests and values. This may involve strengthening regional institutions, building networks of cooperation with other countries in the region, and promoting engagement beyond the competitive binary. To break out of the ideological framework of US democracy against Chinese authoritarianism, Indo-Pacific states should focus on building stronger regional relationships and alliances that prioritize economic cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and multilateral institutions. ASEAN states are among the most well-positioned in the region to do so. Participants singled out Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam as among the most likely ASEAN members to emerge as regional leaders.

50 Hass, Ryan. “Are Worsening US–China Relations in Taiwan’s Interest?” *Brookings*, October 4, 2022. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/10/04/are-worsening-US-China-relations-in-taiwans-interest/>.

51 Cerutti, Eugenio, Gita Gopinath, and Adil Mohommed. “The Impact of US–China Trade Tensions.” *IMF*, May 23, 2019. <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2019/05/23/blog-the-impact-of-US-China-trade-tensions>.
Lin, Bonny, Michael Chase, Jonah Blank, et al. *Regional Responses to U.S.–China Competition in the Indo-Pacific: Study Overview and Conclusions*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR4412>.



Mark Lippert (above), Corporate Executive Vice President of Samsung Electronics America speaks on the fight for the future of technological supremacy, while Tanvi Madan (below), Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution asks a question to the panel.

“Indo-Pacific states should focus on building stronger regional relationships and alliances that prioritize economic cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and multilateral institutions.”

ASEAN should take a proactive approach to US-China competition: nonalignment is a choice in itself, and ASEAN must be actively engaged with rulemaking and cooperation to maximize benefits from new opportunities. Market-oriented supply-chain restructuring may be an important factor in improving the development of industries globally, particularly in Southeast Asia, by promoting the growth of development zones and diversifying supply chains. Participants emphasized that implementation of supply-chain restructuring must be done through multilateral organizations, and complete regionalization should be avoided. ASEAN is well-positioned to activate its role as a regional powerbroker to reduce tensions and diversify supply chains beyond the US-China critical mineral bifurcation.

ASEAN must take greater ownership of its vision statements and improve its capacity to enforce principles and norms. Minilateral groupings involving some ASEAN members and external actors may help build capacity to implement plans. As ASEAN membership is extraordinarily diverse, it has no single voice, so it must prioritize shared goals and institute reforms in partnership with external actors given its limited resources. Reforms such as labor upscaling, capacity building, competition law, and liberalization are critical to achieving ASEAN’s objectives.

Southeast Asian economies may particularly benefit from greater US engagement. The 2022 State of Southeast Asia Survey indicated that the majority of Southeast Asian policymakers welcome greater US economic participation.⁵² If more Southeast Asian states join IPEF, though IPEF does not grant market access, it would signal to the US administration that the region desires increased engagement, and it would serve as a step toward future access to US markets and capital. While IPEF is not a congressionally approved US trade agreement, it may eventually lead to market-opening commitments. US involvement in regulatory trade agreements in Southeast Asia should be avoided, as tariffs that punish noncompliance with environment and labor standards will hurt Southeast Asian economies, which have limited capacity to improve standards in the short-term. Instead, US investment in supply-chain diversification and paths to market access in Southeast Asia, particularly through regional economic institutions, may result in mutual gains and improve labor and climate standards in the long term.

Regarding technological development, participants stressed agency and autonomy as key goals for diverse Southeast Asian economies, which individually and

52 Seah, et al., 2022.



Workshop participants discussed competition within the Indo-Pacific, and the possibility of India emerging as a power in the region.

regionally have different technology priorities than their neighbors. Participants suggested that Southeast Asian states look to examples beyond the United States or China for innovation on data, digital governance, and cybersecurity standards, noting that technological dominance by a state other than the United States and China is a future certainty and that ASEAN is in a unique position to take multilateral leadership.

Participants were generally positive in how they think ASEAN views greater US economic involvement in Southeast Asia, with 41 percent saying that an increase in economic relations would be viewed “somewhat positively,” with 23 percent taking a “neutral” stance or thinking it would be received “somewhat negatively.”

EMERGENCE OF INDIA AS AN INDO-PACIFIC POWER

The potential rise of a third Indo-Pacific power, disrupting the US–China binary, is another possibility. Participants examined India’s unique positioning and a future in which it serves as a leader for the rest of the Indo-Pacific. The status quo perception of India is that it is both aligned and unaligned at once, forging its own path. While India has the potential to play both sides and steer the United States and China, participants noted its recent significant resistance to Chinese regional dominance, such as blocking access to Chinese mobile apps over security concerns.⁵³ India’s current attitude toward China is further visible in its major trade policy: India’s 2019 exit from the China-backed RCEP indicates its desire to reflect the concerns of the Global South.⁵⁴ Despite this, India is a major actor in many multilateral and regional institutions, and

participants encouraged the possibility that it could take the lead on the middle path between the United States and China. Although it may reinforce the competitive environment within the region, India could also serve as a leader and model for similar states that seek to establish their independence while remaining competitive with China.

“India could...serve as a leader and model for similar states that seek to establish their independence while remaining competitive with China.”

Participants traced India’s recent shift in its approach toward China, moving from economic engagement to competition. In the early 2000s, India pursued economic engagement with China, but it now sees the risks of overdependence due to asymmetric and nonreciprocal economic ties, supply-chain concerns caused by China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and Chinese takeovers of Indian companies.⁵⁵ The 2020–2021 border disputes between India and China further fueled concerns about overdependence on China and its dominance in the region’s economic and

53 Reuters. “India Adds 54 More Chinese Apps to Ban List; Sea Says It Complies with Laws.” *Reuters*, February 15, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/india/sea-owned-game-free-fire-unavailable-india-after-ban-chinese-apps-2022-02-15/>.

54 Sundaram, Asha. “India’s RCEP Exit and Its Regional Future.” *East Asia Forum*, April 13, 2022. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/04/13/indias-rcep-exit-and-its-regional-future/>.

55 Kalra, Aditya, and Aftab Ahmed. “India Toughens Rules on Investments from Neighbours, Seen Aimed at China,” *Reuters*, April 18, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-india-investments/india-toughens-rules-on-investments-from-neighbours-seen-aimed-at-china-idUSKBN2200LQ>. Singh, Manish. “To Avoid Hostile Takeovers Amid COVID-19, India Mandates Approvals on Chinese Investments.” *TechCrunch*, April 18, 2020. <https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/18/to-avoid-hostile-takeovers-amid-covid-19-india-mandates-approvals-on-chinese-investments/>.

technological development.⁵⁶ As a result, participants described India as pursuing a three-pronged approach to economic and political resilience: limiting Chinese access to its economy, society, and telecommunications; promoting self-reliance and reshoring to rebuild India's production capabilities; and pursuing bilateralism and cooperation in multilateral organizations like the WTO. While India's measures toward China could be considered overly protectionist, India should pursue a balance between multilateralism and unilateralism, with an emphasis on cooperation with like-minded partners while still engaging with the wider international community.

Participants identified one key challenge to the rise of India as a third Indo-Pacific great power and the limits to its cooperation with the United States: although India portrays itself as an independent bridge, its attitude toward security is more similar to that of China than the United States. Despite this, India is uniquely positioned as a rising power with historic ties to Russia, strong competition with China and Pakistan, and close ties to the United States, and it may balance between these powers. India aims to be a bridge rather than a mediator, particularly when discussing the development challenges of the Global South; participants pointed to India's leadership in the 2023 Voice of the Global South Summit as a key example.⁵⁷ Overall, India's evolving foreign policy presents a possible path out of the US-China box for the Indo-Pacific.

SHARED SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES

Systemic challenges facing the region should be viewed as a fountain of opportunity for cooperation on public goods. Shared challenges may galvanize multilateral and unilateral regional cooperation, possibly under the leadership of emerging Indo-Pacific powers, with the goal of improving global public goods in climate, development, and global health. While participants noted that cooperation on shared challenges may not extend to the US-China technology war, states all have a stake in the security of supply chains, from chips to other critical materials. Decoupling and complete economic bifurcation would incur economic costs for all parties, and these costs may incentivize greater cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific. Participants encouraged policymaking that balances security concerns with development and economic growth, and an approach that includes shared systemic challenges can engender cooperation.

“Shared challenges may galvanize...regional cooperation...with the goal of improving global public goods in climate, development, and global health.”



Throughout the workshop, participants discussed the systemic challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region, and the cooperation needed to face them.

56 Lalwani, Sameer P., Daniel Markey, and Vikram J. Singh. “Another Clash on the India-China Border Underscores Risks of Militarization.” *United States Institute of Peace*, December 20, 2022. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/12/another-clash-india-china-border-underscores-risks-militarization>.

57 Sharma, Kiran. “India Hosts Online Summit to Amplify Voice of Global South.” *Nikkei Asia*, January 13, 2023.

> APPENDIX

Perry World House asked participants to fill out a short survey on key issues related to the theme of the workshop. These figures are thus based on participants' responses. Not all participants answered all questions, and these charts should not be interpreted to represent any individual panelist's view.




Figure 1: Which country do you view as more economically influential in the Indo-Pacific region?




Figure 2: How likely is it that the United States will economically decouple from China?






Figure 3: How likely is it that the US allies and partners will economically decouple from China?

- NOT VERY LIKELY
- NOT LIKELY
- NEUTRAL
- LIKELY
- VERY LIKELY




Figure 4: How successful are multilateral trade pacts/organizations (such as CPTPP, APEC, RCEP, etc) in fostering substantively meaningful economic relationships?

- NOT VERY SUCCESSFUL
- NOT SUCCESSFUL
- NEUTRAL
- SOMEWHAT SUCCESSFUL
- VERY SUCCESSFUL




Figure 5: What effect has the US-China “tech war” had on the Indo-Pacific region’s views of the United States?

- VERY NEGATIVE
- SOMEWHAT NEGATIVE
- NEUTRAL
- SOMEWHAT POSITIVE
- VERY POSITIVE




Figure 6: What effect has the US-China “tech war” had on the region’s views of China?




Figure 7: Over the next 5 years, which ASEAN members will take a larger leadership role in the region?




Figure 8: How do ASEAN members view US efforts to increase its economic relationship with the region?



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> WHAT THE EXPERTS ARE READING

Perry World House asked participants to name books and articles that scholars and policymakers should read on strategic competition between the United States and China, Indo-Pacific technology and economic issues, and Southeast Asia foreign policy priorities. Here is what they recommended.

- ASEAN, ed. 2008. *ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint*. Jakarta, Indonesia: ASEAN Secretariat.
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