

COLLOQUIUM REPORT ON  
**Competing Visions  
of the Global Order**

& STATUS REPORT ON THE  
**Global Order**

*September 24–25, 2018*  
University of Pennsylvania



## ABOUT PERRY WORLD HOUSE

Perry World House is a center for scholarly inquiry, teaching, research, international exchange, policy engagement, and public outreach on pressing global issues.

Perry World House's mission is to bring the academic knowledge of the University of Pennsylvania to bear on some of the world's most pressing global policy challenges, and to foster international policy engagement within and beyond the Penn community.

Located in the heart of campus at 38<sup>th</sup> Street and Locust Walk, it draws on the expertise of Penn's 12 schools and numerous globally-oriented research centers to educate the Penn community and prepare students to be well-informed, contributing global citizens. At the same time, Perry World House connects Penn with leading policy experts from around the world to develop and advance innovative policy proposals.

Through its rich programming, Perry World House facilitates critical conversations about global policy challenges and fosters interdisciplinary research on these topics. It presents workshops and colloquia, welcomes distinguished visitors, and produces content for global audiences and policy leaders, so that the knowledge developed at Penn can make an immediate impact around the world.

Perry World House—its programs and the building itself—builds on Penn's strengths in teaching, interdisciplinary scholarship, and policy-relevant research. By doing so, it cultivates the broad worldview, critical thinking, and leadership required to address the most urgent issues of global affairs.

*The 2018 Global Order Colloquium and this publication were made possible with the generous support of Carnegie Corporation of New York; the Elliott and Harriet Goldstein Private Foundation, and Jesse Friedlander; and Paritosh V. Thakore, W'86 & Hemal Mirani, G'97, WG'97. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.*

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# › EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On September 24–25, 2018, a who’s who of former government officials, diplomats, and journalists joined academic experts at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House for a two-day colloquium focused on “Competing Visions of the Global Order.” The first day of the colloquium featured leading scholars presenting cutting-edge research, with commentary from policymakers with recent government experience. The second day of the colloquium, a public forum, involved four high level discussions about the global order and geopolitics, including the second Penn Biden Leaders Dialogue, featuring Joseph Biden, the 47<sup>th</sup> Vice President of the United States and Benjamin Franklin Presidential Practice Professor at Penn, in conversation with former UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg.

## **SCHOLARLY PROGRAM**

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2018

On the first day of the colloquium, scholars and policy experts convened to exchange views on how the global order is faring at a time of dramatic change and turbulence. With the support of Carnegie Corporation of New York, the colloquium aimed to bridge the gap between academia and the policy world by empowering experts to foster mutual understanding on divisive questions at the intersection of international security, political economy, international law, and global culture. Symposium participants dissected the influence of national interests and proposed interdisciplinary pathways for cooperation in the management and evolution of the great power competition. Participants included academics such as Nina Pavcnik, a Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College, and policymakers such as Nadia Schadlow, a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Perry World House and the former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy.

Taken together, each of the first day’s panels generated conversations that at times were pessimistic as well as optimistic, focused on regional and then global matters, and proposed both private and public solutions. The first panel discussed the latest research on shifts in the international security environment, particularly regional balances of power. The second panel probed the fragility of the economic order as the United States becomes less willing to bear the burden of an open international system. The third panel examined whether the international legal regime can continue to provide a stable basis for addressing human rights violations and generate a framework for diplomatic and economic interactions, and the last panel considered how global culture is changing to reflect not just new voices, but also changing national power dynamics.

## PUBLIC FORUM

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2018

### National Visions

Deborah Amos, an international correspondent with National Public Radio, led a conversation with Lady Cathy Ashton, former Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow and former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Felipe Calderón, Distinguished Global Leader-in-Residence at Perry World House and former president of Mexico; Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University; and Richard Verma, former U.S. Ambassador to India. Participants considered the sources of rising populist sentiment in the West. Ashton noted that many people in Britain and around Europe have genuine concerns about their economic future, but for populist politicians, “blaming the outsider is often a useful tool.” All of the participants recognized the role of polarization in fostering confusion about America’s place in the global order.

**“We are seriously thinking about the future of the global order with leading thinkers and policymakers from the U.S. and the world.”**

*Former Mexican President and Distinguished Global Leader-in-Residence at Perry World House Felipe Calderón*

### Keynote Conversation with Former U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice

Ambassador Susan Rice, who served as the National Security Advisor to President Obama and is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Perry World House this year, participated in a rich conversation about the future of the world order with Ed Luce, the Washington columnist and commentator for the *Financial Times*. “There are many who say America is in decline; I don’t agree with that,” she argued. She also defended the American commitment to multilateralism as the best counterbalance to China’s influence.

“Our strength in Asia has, for decades, been a function substantially of our alliance relationships,” she said, “and we have put our alliance relationships in Asia under enormous strain.” In the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s election and subsequent decisions, including exiting the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, she contended that rebuilding relationships in Asia and elsewhere will not be easy. “We can’t expect that everything will snap back to status quo ante,” she warned.

**“I was impressed by the quality of the student questions and the diversity of the kids who asked the questions—it was striking to me.”**

*Former U.S. National Security Advisor and Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow Susan Rice*

### Keynote Conversation with Former U.S. National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster

During an interview with journalist Lara Logan, H.R. McMaster, former National Security Advisor to President Trump and a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Perry World House, offered a strategic explanation of the 45<sup>th</sup> president’s foreign policy that emphasized the centrality of great power competition. “All of us took a holiday from history after the Cold War,” he argued, “while forgetting some of the things that prevented great power conflict for more than 70 years.” The re-emphasis on great power politics shapes how President Trump thinks about multilateral institutions and agreements. Multilateralism, McMaster explained, has a role in the President’s foreign policy, but only when the positive outcomes for American interests are clear. This approach also led President Trump to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, which McMaster contended was based on a false assumption that reopening Iran to the international economy would result in a moderation of its behavior. McMaster also argued that reading and engaging with academic research on the future of the global order is a critical way to understand the changes ongoing around the world.

**“There was a panel discussion yesterday at Perry World House and if you get access to those papers, some tremendous academics have great research in this area that places the current debate in historical context as well.”**

*Former U.S. National Security Advisor and Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow Lt. Gen (Ret.) H.R. McMaster*

### **Penn Biden Leaders Dialogue**


In the second installment of the Penn Biden Leaders Dialogue, held before an audience of more than 1,000 Penn students, faculty, staff, and community members, 47<sup>th</sup> Vice President of the United States Joe Biden and former UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg expressed worry that U.S. retrenchment from the rules-based international order hampers the ability of the world to respond collectively to global problems, such as financial crises. Together, they identified three sources of distrust in multilateralism. The first, according to Biden, is the “collapse in the basic relationship between how hard you work and how well you do,” a problem that was exacerbated by the Great Recession. Second, populist politicians feed a belief that there is no capacity for the world to solve problems so there is no point in following multilateral rules. Finally, Clegg argued that political polarization, which saps people’s trust in government

and in their fellow citizens, is very hard to combat in countries where the electoral system is winner-takes-all. “Most of the repair job to people’s loss of faith starts at home,” concluded Biden.

Biden and Clegg had an engaging conversation with the community. Together, the two leaders reflected on the need for politicians to listen to the voices of their constituents, particularly the next generation of voters. Alluding to the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, or “Brexit,” Clegg warned, “We are unwittingly dismantling our capacity to act collectively. The repair process begins at home. All politics is local, and we need to return to all the local and domestic issues.” He added, “The loss of faith in our multinational system starts at home.” His own experience in coalition government taught him that “the politics of compromise is very difficult to import into countries where the culture is winner-take-all.”

**“One of the things we are trying to do here at Penn is trying to amend that world order in ways that are able to bring back confidence in the average person in the need for collective action.”**

*47<sup>th</sup> Vice President of the United States and Benjamin Franklin Presidential Practice Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Joe Biden*



“We are unwittingly dismantling our capacity to act collectively. The repair process begins at home. All politics is local, and we need to return to all the local and domestic issues,” Nick Clegg warned.



## > STATUS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL ORDER

As part of the Global Order Colloquium, Perry World House surveyed both academic participants and policymakers to get their perceptions of what sort of shape the order is in. The results reveal that most of the colloquium participants believe that the state of the current global order is “weakening.” Nearly every observer identified serious challenges to the rules-based, multilateral order, but most also argued that the order could be saved or reformed with decisive action. This section summarizes their views, the challenges facing the global order, and productive directions for future research.<sup>1</sup>

### Current State of the Global Order


Participants expressed a sense that tectonic shifts in the global order and its institutions were possible but not yet imminent. In the security realm, the rising relative power of China could lead to conflict with the United States, but there remain serious questions about China’s growth and intentions. The world’s economic and legal frameworks have experienced ebbs and flows since World War II, though the fault lines now emerging between sovereignty, on the one hand, and governance, on the other, could permanently splinter the international regime. An expanding variety of communication media hold enormous promise for solving the world’s most intractable problems, but also expose individuals and states to risks emerging from nefarious users of these technologies.

In the survey, more than three-quarters of respondents said that the order has become “somewhat” or “significantly” weaker, while the rest saw no change.<sup>2</sup> One participant observed, “We overstate the strength of the global order.

<sup>1</sup> Responses were collected from August 20 to September 17, 2018. The response rate was 77%.

<sup>2</sup> One respondent selected “significantly stronger,” but based on the information provided by the respondent in the free-response portion of the question, this answer is believed to be a selection error and was manually recoded to “significantly weaker.”





“Trust in major governing institutions has eroded, resulting in the rise and success of competing actors and institutions.”

“The order can no longer rely on the abstract promise of shared benefits. States now recognize that some have benefited, and some have not.”

*(Anonymous breakout quotes from respondents)*



Even the immediate post-WWII era was marked by false starts and sabotages, and the subsequent decades were punctuated with political and economic crises the world over.” Another participant noted that “many of the underlying values and practices of the global order have shifted incrementally over the past decade, perhaps straining the existing global order but spurring future changes to its norms and rules.” However, when asked about the effectiveness of the global order in particular issue areas, participants’ views of the global order were more varied. In a similar vein, during day two of the colloquium, Lady Catherine Ashton, former EU High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow, argued that informal collections of states such as the G-7 and G-20 may be a more effective venue for international cooperation than the rules-based, inclusive institutions that characterized the past 70 years.

Despite Brexit and the Trump administration’s unilateral tariffs, the global economic order received the highest “grade” for effectiveness, roughly a B+. One respondent wrote, “Despite the recent backlash against globalization, most countries continue to play by the WTO rules in most situations,” though a concern emerged during the colloquium about the Trump administration’s blocking of judicial appointments to the WTO’s appellate body. One participant wondered whether this action could eventually sap the WTO of

legitimacy and leave it as a residual organization, resolving disputes only occasionally.

The participants had a middling view, a low B, of the global order’s ability to maintain a “stable international legal regime.” One of the colloquium’s policy commentators suggested that states may actually prefer flexibility in international law rather than certainty and predictability. One survey respondent argued that leeway within the international legal regime may help preserve the system, writing, “The rules may have a lot of give, but even those states who push against the order have sought to do so within the language and frames of the law.”















On whether the current global order can keep “peace and security,” most respondents gave the order a grade of C or worse. On the one hand, the colloquium participants were generally skeptical about the prospects of all-out war between the United States and China, in part due to the moderating nature of nuclear arms. As one respondent put it, “The post-Cold War global order has been remarkably effective at keeping the global peace, with... a decline in overall interstate wars and in battlefield deaths.” On the other hand, however, “armed violence has gone up over the last few years. The violence patterns we observe are civil wars and so-called ‘crime,’” as another survey respondent observed.


### Future Challenges to the Global Order

Colloquium participants viewed the greatest challenges as emerging not at the international level but in domestic politics. More than half of survey respondents identified “economic inequality” or “growing nationalism” as the biggest threats to the global order. Comments during the public forum echoed the survey’s respondents. 47<sup>th</sup> Vice President of the United States Joe Biden argued that the “collapse in the basic relationship between how hard you work and how well you do” damaged people’s faith in multilateralism to improve their well-being, while former UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg noted that when populist politicians question the capacity of multilateralism to solve problems, the incentives to follow the rules can evaporate.

“Great power competition” was also seen as a probable driver of changes to the rules-based international system, though participants viewed an all-out war between the United States and China as unlikely. Nevertheless, China’s rise will have important consequences for the global order and the United States. Former National Security Advisor and Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow Susan Rice expressed concern that China had replaced the United States both in providing international public goods, such as peacekeeping, and as leader of the Asia–Pacific regional order. “Our strength in Asia has, for decades, been a function substantially of our alliance relationships,” she said, “[and] we have put our alliance relationships in Asia under enormous strain.”

### GRADE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GLOBAL ORDER IN...

KEEPING PEACE & SECURITY	A	
	B	
	C	
	D	
	F	
SUSTAINING A STABLE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME	A	
	B	
	C	
	D	
SUSTAINING GLOBAL COMMERCE	A	
	B	
	C	
	D	
	F	



“Both within and between societies, economic inequality feeds and taps into myriad grievances, which in turn inhibits genuine dialogue.”

“The international system is still organized around nation-states... As such, it remains the most vibrant center of politics and source of social solidarity... it seems likely that nationalism will continue to be the form competition will take.”

(Anonymous breakout quotes from respondents)



## DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This colloquium is part of a wide-ranging effort across academia to “bridge the gap” between scholarship and policymaking. To provide value to the policy community, scholars must know the right questions to ask. Both the academic and policy participants offered their ideas about productive directions for future research, which include:

- › How can the United States be influential without being hegemonic?
- › How resilient are international organizations to structural changes in the global order?
- › What strategies can international institutions adopt to effectively balance predictability with flexibility?
- › Can international negotiations be made more equitable by incorporating ideas about the relationship between culture, language, and psychology?
- › What are the consequences of misinformation and disinformation in the wider information ecosystem (not just on social media)?
- › How has the treatment of indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants influenced the inclusiveness of the global order?

**Perry World House will consider some of these issues as part of the Future of the Global Order research theme.**

# > DAY ONE

## > POWER TRANSITIONS

### *Panel One*

*Note: Academic panels were conducted according to Chatham House rules. All direct quotations are from panelists' thought pieces submitted prior to the colloquium.*

*The power panel discussed the latest research on shifts in the international security environment, including the distribution of power in a regional context. Nadia Schadlow, Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow and former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy in the Trump administration, served as the policy commentator. She joined academic panelists including David Edelstein (Georgetown University), Stephanie Hofmann (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), David Kang (University of Southern California), and Wu Xinbo (Fudan University). Avery Goldstein (University of Pennsylvania) chaired the panel.*

### **CONFLICT BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IS UNLIKELY**

Several panelists believed that direct conflict between the United States and China is unlikely, unless American interests in the South China Sea are put at risk. As David Edelstein stated, “War is most likely to occur through a process of alliance entrapment that has been underappreciated by advocates of an American-led global international order.” David Kang urged a more careful analysis of the East Asian historical record before jumping to conclusions regarding the possibility of Sino–American conflict; he alluded to the challenges domestic crises have posed to a rising China in the past. He explained, “For China, immense internal problems may limit its immediate ability to challenge the United States.”

### **THE UNKNOWN STRENGTH OF SMALLER POWERS**

While China and the United States were the focus of conversation, panelists also considered the strength of smaller nations. Edelstein warned that “smaller powers may be tempted to provoke China precisely to generate [an] American response.” For this reason, one panelist added that it is likely that the U.S. commitment to East Asia will decline substantially in the coming years. However, Kang argued that it is not American allies, but rather the domestic sphere from which the most central challenges to American hegemony arise. “From a massive financial crisis to a civil society that is fracturing in ways not seen in a half-century, the United States may inflict far more damage on itself than any external competitor could,” he said.

### **KEEPING RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE PICTURE**

Some panelists expressed concern that conversations on power were too oriented around China and ignored the strength and influence of Russia, the European Union, and NATO. Edelstein noted that “[w]hile Russia’s relative power has not been increasing at the same rate as China’s, it feels empowered to pursue a broader range of interests in both Europe and the Middle East.” Stephanie Hofmann remarked on the dynamic ways in which strategic partners, competitors, and challenges to the global order can shift over time. One example of this phenomenon, she argued, is seen in Russia’s revisionist policies toward its near abroad, which have put pressure on the United States to reaffirm its commitment to Europe (in particular, Central and Eastern European countries). To ignore Russia, multiple panelists agreed, would be a perilous mistake.



## NEXT STEPS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

**What empirical strategies can identify when great power competition is occurring?** Panelists sought to identify specific case studies and regions in the world that could prove or disprove arguments about the future of the global order. Kang gestured towards smaller nations in East Asia. Hoffman suggested a continued focus on the United States' relationship with the European Union and NATO.

**What brings order to the global level and how do multilateral actors engage with that order?**

Hofmann noted, "With the creation of multiple multilateral actors working on the same or similar issue areas, we have created a system that needs less consent to decide on (regional or issue-specific) multilateral actions. The proliferation of many multilateral forums constitutes the process through which order is lived and created."

**What will the future Asian regional order look like?**

Edelstein hypothesized that the U.S. commitment to East Asia might weaken substantially in the coming decades: "If American relative power continues to decline relative to China, it will be difficult for the U.S. to sustain a presence in East Asia that is more reassuring than it is dangerous... [w]hile smaller powers may pursue various strategies to constrain assertions of Chinese power, their options will be limited, especially if the United States signals that it is unwilling to be drawn into a war in East Asia."

**How do scholars and policymakers define terms like "power," "order" and "competition"?**

Different definitions of terms such as "power," "order" and "competition" led many on the panel to argue for sharpening and honing the language used to clarify the nature and scope of ongoing geopolitical tensions.

**What impact will China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have on the global order?**

Wu Xinbo contended that "the BRI, if successfully implemented, will have the potential to exercise a series of impacts on the existing world economic order: making up for the deficits in the public goods provided by the World Bank, Asia Development Bank (ADB) and other international financial institutions, promoting economic cooperation among developing countries and reducing their dependence on the developed world, and, eventually, facilitating the reform of the existing world economic governance system."

## > ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS

### *Panel Two*

*Ryan Brutger, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, moderated a panel on the consequences of the relative decline of American power for the liberal economic order. Julia Gray (University of Pennsylvania), Mauro Guillen (University of Pennsylvania), Helen Milner (Princeton University), and Nina Pavcnik (Dartmouth College) served as academic participants. Peter Harrell, Perry World House Visiting Fellow and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions, served as the policy commentator.*

### **THE GLOBALIZATION BACKLASH IS NOT NEW OR SURPRISING**

The panelists agreed that the surge in support for right-wing populist parties in developed countries was a troubling phenomenon, but several pointed out that setbacks to the global economic order are nothing new. As Julia Gray noted, “the unacknowledged history of international cooperation is one of setbacks, false starts, exits, and dissolutions,” such as the U.S. failure to ratify the International Trade Organization, the end of the gold standard in 1971, and a number of trade wars begun by President Reagan. For the United States in particular, there has long been a tension between universal and regional visions of the economic order. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was always a Western-centric institution, and one created at a time when the United States held a trade surplus. Alliance politics during the Cold War encouraged further liberalization even as the United States became a net exporter. After the Cold War, a period of strong domestic growth and real median wage increases allowed liberalization to continue without serious challenges.

In this context, the long period of increasing globalization is more surprising than contemporary efforts to reverse it. Trade has always created domestic winners and losers, but the political importance of these distributional effects is increasing. Nina Pavcnik observed, “the rapid integration of emerging economies into the global market since the 1980s has made the potential earnings and jobs losses in high income countries more salient.” Trade with the Global South, mainly in labor-intensive manufacturing industries, threatens low-skilled workers in developed economies. These effects combine with faster technological change, increasing global migration, and falling unionization to harm blue-collar workers on both the employment and wage fronts.

### **RIGHT-WING POPULISM IS AN EFFECTIVE ELECTORAL PLATFORM**

Low-skilled workers not only experience economic shocks from these developments, but also a shift in their political and social beliefs. “An important aspect of this political turn of events,” said Mauro Guillen, “[is] the historical transformation of the mindset of blue-collar workers, who in Europe and the U.S. [have] ceased... to fully buy into the values of the middle class.” The panelists defined populism as containing a social agenda: to retake power from elites (especially in finance) and return the nation to a set of traditional values. Party platforms around the world, not just on the right, are becoming more nationalist, protectionist, and anti-immigrant. Helen Milner argued that right-wing populism is particularly effective at creating cross-constituency appeal by combining protectionism as “compensation” for workers threatened by globalization with retrenchment of the welfare state and the tax revenues required to sustain it. One panelist also noted that it has also been disorienting for left parties to see a significant portion of their platforms absorbed by right-wing populists.

### **POPULISM HAS “A SURPRISINGLY LONG HALF-LIFE”**

The panelists nearly unanimously believed that right-wing populism and protectionism will have negative consequences for both domestic economies and the global economy. An audience member noted that the 2007 Global Financial Crisis was characterized by rapid, coordinated international action, and a panelist responded that the United States may have alienated enough allies that if another global crisis occurred, such coordination would be unlikely. Another panelist noted that it appears that the Trump administration is beginning to acknowledge that it cannot put pressure on China without the support of EU and NAFTA partners. The panelists disagreed about whether the “identity reward” of sovereignty will be sufficient to sustain support for EU withdrawal in the event of a “hard Brexit.” While right-wing populists might conceivably be concerned about failing to produce the results that they promise, one panelist argued that populism has “a surprisingly long half-life” since there are always other groups to scapegoat for policy failures.

As Julia Gray noted, “the unacknowledged history of international cooperation is one of setbacks, false starts, exits, and dissolutions.”

### WHITHER THE WTO?

The panelists pointed out two serious challenges to the future of the World Trade Organization (WTO). First, the Trump administration has blocked the appointments of appellate judges which threatens to paralyze the dispute settlement mechanism. Second, the Trump administration’s national security rationale for steel and aluminum tariffs places the WTO in a difficult position: either rule against the duties, which ignites sovereignty concerns among member states, or allows the tariffs to remain and open the floodgates to new protectionist measures. Some panelists worried that the WTO may end up as a “zombie” organization which is no longer the locus of action on trade matters and only settles disputes occasionally.



### NEXT STEPS AND OPEN QUESTIONS

**Is there space to embed compensation for globalization’s losers in international agreements on trade?** For example, the proposed U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement includes a wage floor for auto workers of \$16/hour. However, these kinds of policies are antithetical to the idea of free trade.

**Will unilateral rulemaking by the world’s largest economies take the place of the multilateral rules-based order?** When the EU recently updated its data privacy regulations, technology companies around the world—even those not operating in the EU—updated their terms of service to comply. What will happen when China and India start implementing their own rules as well, such as in the case of mergers and acquisitions? Most major mergers and acquisitions must already go through Chinese regulators for approval.

### What is the strategic direction of the Trump administration’s policies towards China?

There appears to be wide agreement within the Administration that more pressure on China is needed, but two factions have emerged. One group seeks significant reforms within China, while the other is more concerned about China’s role as a strategic competitor.



## > LEGAL & INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS

### *Panel Three*

*Craig Martin, Perry World House Visiting Scholar and Professor of Law at Washburn University, moderated a panel on whether the international legal order is elastic enough to accommodate different national visions of international law. Asli Bâli (University of California, Los Angeles), William Burke-White (Inaugural Director, Perry World House), Harlan Cohen (University of Georgia), Cosette Creamer (Perry World House Lightning Scholar and University of Minnesota), and Oliver Stuenkel (Getulio Vargas Foundation) served as academic participants. John B. Bellinger III, former Legal Advisor to the Department of State and the National Security Council, served as the policy commentator, and Lady Catherine Ashton, former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow, also offered comments.*

### **CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW ORIGINATE IN THE ORDER ITSELF**

Some panelists viewed challenges to the international legal order as a manifestation of long-festered “unresolved tensions... always visible to those who looked closely, [and] now apparent to everyone,” as Harlan Cohen put it. The exact nature of these tensions was the topic of fruitful discussion. For Cohen, the current legal order was built on a compromise between two contrasting visions for international law: to achieve cooperation and provide public goods, versus to manage competition and conflict between states. Each of these visions also implies different notions about the trajectory of the global order. The former calls for “ever closer union”—broadening and deepening—as in the case of the European Union. The latter expects renegotiation as strategic contexts change, such as the 16-year sunset provision in the proposed U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement.

Cosette Creamer identified the origin of the WTO’s legitimacy crisis in the growing chasm between the judicial and political branches of the organization. “The WTO’s dispute settlement system has faced a continuing low-grade crisis almost since its inception,” she observed. The diplomatic paralysis among member states—exemplified by the virtual death of the Doha Round of trade negotiations—has forced judges to resolve disputes that ordinarily would have caused states to develop new rules amongst themselves. Contention around the growing mandate of the DSM’s Appellate Body (AB) has existed for many years, and the Trump administration’s decision to block appointments to the AB reflects these concerns. For both Creamer and Cohen, tensions around

the international legal regime result from a belief that multilateralism is like riding a bike: just keep moving forward and you will not fall over.

### **THE UNITED STATES, NOT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, IS ESCALATING TENSIONS**

The panelists were skeptical that developing countries are trying to spoil the current international legal order. Oliver Stuenkel noted that institutions, usually imagined to reflect the balance of power in the West, were actually designed “with far more influence exerted by developing countries than is often thought.” For example, the right to national self-determination was championed by developing countries seeking to free themselves from imperial domination, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has hired a number of staff from the World Bank. Conflict emerges when Western powers employ the international legal regime to advance their own interests. For instance, African leaders were instrumental in the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), but the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 induced concerns about how powerful countries operationalize this norm. Moreover, one panelist observed that other actors, like Brazil and the European Union, have not challenged the supremacy of the United States in ways that might have been expected a few years ago.

Asli Bâli argued that the most revisionist state in the system is the United States, since when the United States “exempts itself from institutional participation and breaks the rules, it is not merely acting as a scofflaw. Its actions may impact the nature of the rules themselves, altering their content.” Specifically, the United States’ lax approach to following the rules has been complimented by a more fixed and rigid understanding of sovereignty. Whereas the United States was once willing to violate other states’ sovereignty to advance its values or interests, the Trump administration now adopts a view—more similar to China and Russia—which treats all states’ sovereignty as fundamentally inviolable.

What, then, to make of China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or Turkey’s “Eurasian pivot”? Bâli suggested that “increased institutional pluralism and overlapping regimes... will produce greater fragmentation in the international legal order,” with new institutions running parallel to, and not in competition with, existing institutions. The panelists generally expected countries to make greater use of “forum shopping”, deciding which organizations to use for particular problems based on how well they will be able to advance their preferences.



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#### **NEXT STEPS AND OPEN QUESTIONS**

**What should be made of the American “treaty trough”?** During George W. Bush’s presidency, the Senate approved 163 treaties, more than at any other time in American history. But during the Obama administration, the Senate only ratified about two dozen treaties. So far, only six treaties have been approved in the Trump administration. Are other forms of international rule-making replacing treaties or is there a dearth of rule development today? How do we reconcile the turn from multilateralism to regionalism and bilateralism with an overall decline in treaty-making by the United States?

**Is multilateralism an end in itself or a means to an end?** One panelist argued that the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities because the American public was not sufficiently sold on the benefits of the treaty. Would the public renew its support of the international legal order if multilateralism is framed instrumentally rather than normatively?

**Are certainty and predictability—often championed as the benefits of international law—desirable in international relations?** What if states prefer flexibility over stability? How can international organizations incorporate the demand for change and still deliver on their core missions, especially given the tendency towards path-dependence?



## > COMMUNICATIONS & CULTURAL TRANSITIONS

### *Panel Four*

*Scholars of the arts, communications, and the humanities convened to debate how global culture is changing to reflect not just new voices, but also changing national power dynamics. They also examined how national competition is manifesting itself in film, literature, music, radio, and language, and how the cultural conversation is evolving amid other global changes. The panelists included Amelia Arsenault (Senior Advisor for Public Diplomacy Research and Evaluation, State Department and Georgia State University, attending in her personal capacity), James Lantolf (Penn State), Marwan Kraidy (University of Pennsylvania), Kevin Platt (University of Pennsylvania), Guobin Yang (University of Pennsylvania), Luisa Ossa (La Salle University), and Shawn Powers (Senior Advisor for Global Strategy & Innovation, U.S. Agency for Global Media).*

#### **GLOBAL MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS REFLECT EACH OTHER**

The general understanding of international relations, remarked Marwan Kraidy, “has often excluded media, or focused exclusively on news, because it considers entertainment, merely cultural, to be politically inconsequential.” Panelists highlighted the myriad technological innovations and emerging media and markets that have a linkage to the future of the global order. Kevin Platt noted that the “globalized entertainment industry... brings Hollywood (and Bollywood) films, television shows (*Game of Thrones*), and formats (talent shows, reality shows, etc.) and mass novels and genres (detective thrillers, romance, science fiction) to audiences in Barnaul, Shanghai, Cleveland and Luanda.” However, other panelists argued that the legacy of slavery leads to the erasure of Indigenous, African, and Asian voices, among others, in global media, such as through the role of racism in media distribution.

#### **ONLINE ACTIVISM IS STIFLED BY CENSORSHIP**

One panelist identified ways in which digital technologies can help spread and inspire digital activism, but many of these platforms are at risk of being censored by individual nations. American policymakers face continuing obstacles in making sense of China’s digital landscape and online censorship. Guobin Yang noted some of the paradoxes at play: “Chinese media’s active use of American social media platforms is part of this effort to tell China stories to the world. Considering that all these platforms are blocked and inaccessible from inside China, it is ironic that Chinese official media agencies are so keen on using them.”



#### **NEXT STEPS AND OPEN QUESTIONS**

**What role does language play in shaping the global order?** James Lantolf contended that “there is much to gain...by studying the central role of language in the global order provided the connections can be appropriately theorized.”

**In what ways are global communications infrastructures and media production companies susceptible to ongoing political pressures?**

**To what extent is there a disconnect between cultures of diplomacy and of communication?** Furthermore, how can governments leverage social media in initiatives concerning cultural diplomacy?

The general understanding of international relations, remarked Marwan Kraidy, “has often excluded media, or focused exclusively on news, because it considers entertainment, merely cultural, to be politically inconsequential.”

## › DINNER CONVERSATION WITH LADY CATHERINE ASHTON & NADIA SCHADLOW

### *Policy Dialogue*

*To what extent is the Trump administration's foreign policy a break from past administrations? What will the effect of any changes in U.S. foreign policy be on the transatlantic relationship? And what will be the impact of Brexit on the global order? To answer these questions, Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow and former Deputy National Security Advisor Nadia Schadlow and former Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow and former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Lady Catherine Ashton engaged in a discussion moderated by Survival editor Dana Allin.*

#### **IS MULTILATERALISM WORTH SAVING?**

Lady Catherine Ashton and Nadia Schadlow offered different views of the effectiveness of the Trump administration's pullback from multilateralism. Schadlow argued that President Trump is clarifying problems that had long been brewing under the surface of the global order, notably that given limited time and resources, multilateralism is not always the best operational approach for the United States. Lady Ashton agreed that multilateralism is imperfect, but saw more value in reform rather than retrenchment. In particular, she advocated freeing up international organizations to make choices about which issues matter and when they should take part in the decision-making process.

#### **THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP IS STRAINED**

Lady Ashton observed that the Trump administration's attitude toward Europe has had negative consequences for transatlantic cooperation. Europeans are not accustomed

to an American President that does not see the EU as an essential institution, and the question of NATO spending commitments has inadvertently become conflated with "paying for Europe's defense" and issues regarding Russia. Schadlow responded that the "U.S. response to the European Union is not a determinant of the EU's problems," which are the result of structural concerns within the Union itself. Lady Ashton acknowledged that the EU's former policy of forcing countries to accept asylum seekers had caused tension between the organization and its member states, and that the major European countries must do a better job convincing newer member states of the value of integration.

#### **DEAL OR NO IRAN DEAL?**

On the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Lady Ashton expressed concern that U.S. withdrawal signaled a lack of commitment by the United States to stand by its international agreements. Schadlow pointed out that the JCPOA had been controversial in the United States since its inception, and that when there are domestically controversial strategic issues, it may be worthwhile for the President to put political capital into converting the agreement into a Senate-approved treaty. She added that there will always be uncertainty about international commitments when governments change, including European governments. Lady Ashton noted that the JCPOA was not the answer to all the challenges with Iran, but also argued that a sequential approach of additional agreements covering new issues would have been far more strategic than ripping up one deal in an attempt to replace it with a likely unachievable new agreement.

# › DAY TWO

## › NATIONAL VISIONS

### *Panel One*

*There is no single national vision of the global order. Moreover, the Western consensus around a rules-based, multilateral order has begun to fragment, allowing competing ideas about the conduct of international relations to emerge. How can the global order accommodate these various national visions? Which national visions are likely to dominate, and what will the consequences be for world politics? NPR Middle East Correspondent Deborah Amos moderated a discussion with former Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow and former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Lady Catherine Ashton, Perry World House Distinguished Global Leader-in-Residence and former President of Mexico Felipe Calderón, former U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma, and Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University Aaron Friedberg around these questions.*

### **THE UNITED STATES RETRENCHES, CHINA ADVANCES**

The panelists frequently referenced the vacuum in global leadership created by U.S. retrenchment under the Trump administration. Ambassador Richard Verma argued that other countries are less willing to cooperate in light of American reticence toward multilateralism, and he expressed skepticism about the efficacy of a foreign policy centered on military strength. “It’s an approach to shaping the global order that lacks a moral compass,” he said, “[and] it guts our ability to shape the world.” Likewise, President Felipe Calderón believed that American attitudes towards international institutions weaken U.S. soft power projection.

Aaron Friedberg foresaw China stepping into the leadership role previously held by the United States. Although “China’s leaders have not yet fully articulated an alternative vision of the global order,” they see problems with the Western-led order (such as universalist notions of human right) and wants to insulate China from those pressures. Ambassador Verma observed that countries like India now warn the United States about the dangers of protectionism, rather than the other way around. Given the probability of shifting hierarchy in the global order, Friedberg commented, “It’s almost impossible to believe, looking back 25 years, that people believed it was the end of history” after the Cold War.

### **CONTENTION OVER MIGRATION**

All of the panelists were deeply troubled by the global response to migration. President Calderón suggested that because migration provokes complicated international consequences, the issue is best addressed in the framework of global rules and organizations. However, he pointed out that the United Nations has “been completely obsolete in dealing with this issue.” Friedberg argued that migration has historically been a source of strategic advantage for the United States, providing a large, youthful working and fighting population, but wondered whether the pace and volume of migration had resulted in political backlash. Lady Catherine Ashton believed that political leaders have “not been successful is in trying to explain the value of the diversity of the world in which we live and the benefits of that diversity that will come to each community.” She laid out three steps that governments should take to alleviate migration pressures. First,



developed countries must inject themselves into the problems that drive out-migration, both to stem further migration and allow those who already left to return home. Second, economic growth is the best antidote to anti-immigrant sentiment, and third, we must accept that the world has always had a degree of migration which created robust, diverse societies. As she summarized, “Either we find a solution to people who are on the move, or we will need to build our walls higher and higher and deal with the consequences of those countries that do not.”

**ALEXA, GIVE ME GLOBAL ORDER**

The panelists also briefly considered the changing role of technology in structuring international relations. On the one hand, new technologies hold enormous promise for solving global issues. “We are at the foothills of understanding the value of the [technological] tools that we use every day,” said Lady Ashton. On the other hand, at least two concerns emerged. The first was the growing influence of multinational corporations in shaping the global order due to their market influence. Ambassador Verma wondered whether corporate leaders in Silicon Valley have more influence in shaping decisions than U.S. government principals. The second issue was the privacy of individuals’ data, which is of particular interest in the European Union. The world must find a way to “balance the great things we can do with the things that we also want to keep safe,” argued Lady Ashton.

As Lady Catherine Ashton summarized, “Either we find a solution to people who are on the move, or we will need to build our walls higher and higher and deal with the consequences of those countries that do not.”

## > CONVERSATION WITH FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SUSAN RICE

### Keynote

*Ambassador Susan Rice, who served as the National Security Advisor to President Obama from 2013 to 2017, and is a Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow, participated in a conversation about the future of the world order with Financial Times Washington columnist Ed Luce. “There are many who say America is in decline; I don’t agree with that,” she declared. Rice defended the American commitment to multilateralism as the best counterbalance to China’s influence. “Our strength in Asia has, for decades, been a function substantially of our alliance relationships,” she said, “and we have put our alliance relationships in Asia under enormous strain.” In the wake of President Trump’s foreign policy decisions, including exiting the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, she contended that rebuilding relationships in Asia and elsewhere will not be easy. “We can’t expect that everything will snap back to status quo ante,” she warned.*

### FUTURE DIRECTIONS, DOMESTIC TENSIONS

**“The United States remains the world’s largest economy by a substantial share, the world’s strongest military. We have an extraordinarily diverse population. We have the best universities in the world. We have extraordinary natural resources and increasing natural resource independence, and we have the greatest system of alliances and partnerships that’s ever been established in the world.”**

*Susan Rice*

Rice noted, “The greatest national security threat today is our own internal political division.” She identified infrastructure, education, immigration, and the strength of democratic institutions as key policy priorities of any presidential administration, because without internal stability, it is challenging to stay a powerful actor on the global stage. Still, the Trump administration introduced new challenges to an already turbulent geopolitical environment. “I don’t think we can assume in any circumstance that the world two years hence will be the same that it was two years prior. The world is changing, and we have to reckon with that,” she stated.

### ALLIANCES IN LIMBO: A CHANGING WORLD, SHIFTING GLOBAL COMMITMENTS

**“We may have inflicted lasting damage on the methods and means of international cooperation, on our alliances.”**

*Susan Rice*

Many of America’s strategic partners fear that the United States abandoned the rule of law, basic human freedoms, and traditional alliance orientation. In order to wield power, Rice stressed, the United States needs to support its allies instead of focusing exclusively on disagreements. Part of the challenge is to prioritize old partnerships and not become attached to policy projects that are not likely to come to fruition. For example, she said, “I’ll believe a Space Command when I see it.”

### CHINA AND RUSSIA ON THE RISE

**“China is growing in strength and in influence, economically.”**

*Susan Rice*

Rice raised the point that China seems to have abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum: “Hide your strength, bide your time.” Instead, under President Xi Jinping, China adopted an aggressive security policy in Asia. For Rice, the South China Sea in particular represents a potential site for commercial or military conflict, especially if traditional rule of law is ignored by the relevant stakeholders. “China, by virtue of its economic strength, is going to be an important player in the global stage, but that does not mean that the United States is necessarily weaker or bound to inevitable conflict,” she said.

**“Under Medvedev, we actually got a lot done.”**

*Susan Rice*

China and Russia managed to put a lot of pressure on countries with whom the United States has traditionally maintained strong relationships, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The United States further complicated the evolving geopolitical landscape, Rice stressed, by putting our alliance relationships in Europe and Asia under tremendous strain. Instead of using American strategic alliances to effectively challenge China and Russia, the Trump administration misplayed its hand.

## › CONVERSATION WITH FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR H.R. MCMASTER

### Keynote

*During an interview with CBS News' Lara Logan, former National Security Advisor and Perry World House Distinguished Visiting Fellow H.R. McMaster offered a strategic explanation of President Trump's foreign policy that emphasized the centrality of great power competition. "All of us took a holiday from history after the Cold War," he argued, "while forgetting some of the things that prevented great power conflict for more than 70 years." This approach led President Trump to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, which McMaster argued was based on a false assumption that reopening Iran to the international economy would result in a moderation of its behavior. Multilateralism, McMaster explained, has a role in the President's foreign policy, but only when the positive outcomes for American interests are clear.*

*He also spoke about the challenges of dealing with North Korea, pointing to the risks of proliferation that come from North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons and long range missiles. McMaster said, "We know that nobody has ever made a weapon they didn't sell to somebody else." He added, "There's a real danger of even transnational terrorist organizations getting the most destructive weapon on Earth."*

### THE UNITED STATES AS PROTECTOR OF FREE AND OPEN SOCIETIES

**"We thought that the era of great power competition was over."**

*H.R. McMaster*

McMaster remarked that many policymakers took a holiday from history in the post-Cold War period, choosing to forget the arc of history that led to the development of free and open societies. "I think we developed a tendency to be overly optimistic about the degree of agency and control we have over complex situations," he explained.

### STRATEGIC NARCISSISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

**"Well of course, what we knew clearly in retrospect is wars don't end when you leave. And bad things can happen after you leave that can affect your vital interests."**

*H.R. McMaster*

McMaster spoke extensively about the pitfalls of strategic narcissism, or the tendency to define the world only in relation to the United States and how American leaders would like it to be. He recalled that "there was a joke in Iraq: there was Iraq and there was Myraq. And Myraq could be whatever you wanted it to be." Americans tend to perceive foreign policy struggles through partisan frameworks. "It doesn't matter if it's Democratic or Republican. As you know, there is a very strong strain of isolationism in the Republican party. And there's a point in the circle where Republican isolationism leads to Democratic entrenchment. And I would say that both philosophies are consistent with each other in that they're hubristic," declared McMaster.


### LEAKS AND OTHER NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

**"Some of these leaks have an immediate effect and place U.S. officials and servicemen and women in greater danger, undermining really critical capabilities by revealing the nature of those capabilities, whether it's space or cyberspace and so forth."**

*H.R. McMaster*

One of the main struggles Americans face in engaging meaningfully with other nations and their citizens is their tendency to not understand basic elements of warfare, fundamental notions of strategic risk, and foreign systems of governance. There are also basic gaps

“I do believe that under the previous administration, there was a conscious decision to disengage without really a recognition of what the disadvantages of that disengagement would be,” H.R. McMaster said regarding the issue of troop withdrawal from the Middle East.



in cartographic knowledge that permeate down to a local level. McMaster put this issue in slightly different terms: “If you can’t even name your enemy, then what is your understanding of the degree to which your enemy can affect the future course of events?” Another issue that has divided policymakers is troop withdrawal from the Middle East. McMaster discussed the bleeding over of the Syrian Civil War into Iraq and into ISIS’s ability to control territory, populations, and resources. “I do believe that under the previous administration, there was a conscious decision to disengage without really a recognition of what the disadvantages of that disengagement would be,” he said.

For McMaster, the questions to ask in any strategic national security conversation revolve around the needs and strategic interests of the United States:

1. *Does the policy protect the American people, the homeland, and interests abroad?*
2. *Is the policy a representation of peace through strength?*
3. *Does the policy promote American prosperity?*
4. *Does the policy advance American influence?*

On NATO, McMaster remarked, “I don’t think that the United States has stepped back in any way from its moral responsibilities.” Instead, the Trump administration is challenging the long legacy of subsidizing the defense of other countries, many of whom have not shouldered their fair share of the burden.



## › CONVERSATION BETWEEN 47<sup>TH</sup> VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES JOE BIDEN AND FORMER UK DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NICK CLEGG

*Penn Biden Leaders Dialogue*

*The second installment of the Penn Biden Leaders Dialogue featured 47<sup>th</sup> Vice President of the United States Joe Biden and former UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. The two leaders discussed a range of issues, including the strategic value of multilateralism, the rise of right-wing populism, economic inequality, and education. The event was held before an audience of more than 1,000 Penn students, faculty, staff, and other community members.*

### **“COLLAPSE IN THE FAITH IN ANY ORDER AT ALL”**

Both leaders were troubled by worldwide retrenchment from the rules-based global order. Vice President Joe Biden worried that “we are unwittingly dismantling our capacity to react collectively to collective threats,” and Nick Clegg wondered whether the multilateral response to the 2007 Global Financial Crisis would be replicable if a systemic crisis occurred today. Together, they identified three sources of distrust in multilateralism. The first, according to Vice President Biden, is the “collapse in the basic relationship between how hard you work and how well you do,” a problem that was exacerbated by the Great Recession. Second, populist politicians feed a belief that there is no capacity for the world to solve problems so there is no point in following multilateral rules. Finally, Clegg argued that political

polarization, which saps people’s trust in government and in their fellow citizens, is very hard to combat in countries where the electoral system is winner-takes-all. In combination, these forces create “the greatest threat [to the global order]... the collapse in the faith in any order at all,” as Clegg put it.

### **RESTORING FAITH IN THE GLOBAL ORDER**


“Most of the repair job to people’s loss of faith starts at home,” said Vice President Biden. Both leaders argued for expanding educational opportunities beyond the traditional four-year college degree, whether through continuing education in job-ready skills or reaffirming the value of vocational programs. But international developments also caught their attention. Clegg stated that he was “struck by the keen sense of history” in China which sees that country as having missed out on the last industrial revolution and is determined not to fall behind again. Because of this, China will be unlikely to temper its aspirations for global leadership. Clegg also believed that the European continent is “in desperate need of cohesion, but there are very powerful forces pulling the countries apart.” Finally, Clegg noted that if Democrats win control of Congress in the 2018 midterm elections, it will send a signal to other countries that “the pendulum can swing the other way” in terms of American support for the global order.

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# › ENGAGEMENT PLAN

**This section identifies open questions and issues that emerged from the colloquium and suggests actionable steps that Perry World House, the broader academic and think tank communities, and governmental agencies could take in order to explore these areas further. It will also be important to revisit the key claims and predictions of the colloquium participants as the global order changes to assess the state of knowledge on the global order and how to improve prediction and anticipatory policymaking. Among the areas that require further investigation are:**

- How do policymakers and academics define key concepts like global order, nationalism, and populism?
- To what extent is great power competition likely to persist in the foreseeable future?
- Will rules issued by the world's largest economies on product standards, internet regulation, and other areas replace multilateral frameworks as firms and supply chains become more globalized?
- What steps might be taken by nations and international organizations to ensure that the interests of marginalized groups, such as women, indigenous peoples, and ethnic and religious minorities, can be incorporated into a more inclusive global order?
- What will the regional Asia–Pacific order look like? To what extent will the Sino–American dispute over the South China Sea factor into this regional order?
- How can states leverage the promise of new technologies while also shielding their citizens from the risks posed by those same tools?
- Can there be multilateralism for its own sake, or is multilateralism only a means to an end?
- Do states prefer certainty and predictability, or flexibility, in international law? Do these preferences vary across countries and issue areas?



To address these questions, two future workshop formats might helpfully build on the issues discussed at Perry World House. First, in order to engage perspectives from outside the Anglo–American sphere and achieve a more inclusive dialogue, participants in future workshops on the global order should explicitly include more scholars and practitioners who predominantly conduct their work in languages other than English. These individuals may be exposed to different sources of news and information or have access to other policymaking fora than predominantly English users. Second, the “bridging the gap”-style conference often consists of panels of academics sharing their research followed by commentary from the policymaking community. This format implies that the policymaker has insight which the academic does not, which is certainly true in some situations. However, policymakers also have assumptions, worldviews, and belief systems that can be challenged by evidence-based academic research. Future colloquia could “flip the script” by holding panels of policymakers followed by an academic commentator who can advise the panelists on whether their approach to a particular policy issue is supported by the research in that field. This will also help scholars clarify the gaps in knowledge in the policy world and direct their work towards the most productive avenues.

Additionally, the participants in the academic day of the colloquium offered their ideas about productive avenues for future research. These topics and questions are ideal for policy briefs, working paper series, and commissioned reports. They include:

- How has the treatment of indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants affected the inclusiveness of the global order?
- How might non-Westphalian histories of international relations, particularly in East Asia, impact the future of regional orders?
- Which empirical approaches can accurately measure disorder in the domestic sphere and its impact on the global order?
- What types of compensation policies might temper the globalization backlash in the West?
- How will Russia play into great power competition between the United States and China?
- What types of international organizations are resilient to changes in the global order, and which ones are likely to disappear or disband?



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